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ABSTRACT
This research aims at testing the effects of ownership structure
on efficiency of various organizational forms: privately-owned
regulated electric utilities (PR), publicly-owned electric utilities
(PU), and consumer-owned cooperative electric utilities (CO).
Because of the attenuation of their structure of property rights
and high enforcement costs, it is expected that all three organiza
tional forms (PR, PU,( CO) will show some level of inefficiency.
However,

it is more difficult to establish which organizational

form will be most efficient since all aspects of property rights are
qualitative in nature. CO is expected to be more efficient than PR
and PU since it shows:

(a) more homogeneity of interest among

principals; (b) more Individual ownership claim over the assets; (c)
a simpler political market (efficiency as the main issue of concern,
and election every year); (d) a stronger monitoring structure when
the control activity of the Rural Electrification Administration is
considered. PU and PR cannot be discriminated and are expected to be
as (in)efficlent.
The methodology used to test for efficiency differences requires
the selection of an appropriate estimator

(stochastic frontier

model), an objective function (cost minimization), and a functional
form to capture the characteristics of technology

(Cobb-Douglas

production function) from which we can derive the economic models to
be estimated (long and short run cost functions and a system of
equations). Such a methodology is appropriate since it provides us
with an absolute measure of mean technical and allocative efficlen-

vii

cles

for each ownership structure considered. Those models are

estimated using MLE and Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm using data
measured at the plant level from steam generating electric utilities.
The essential idea behind the
the error term

stochastic frontier model is that

is composed of two parts: a symmetric component that

permits random variation of the frontier across firms, and captures
the effect of measurement error, other statistical noise, and random
shocks outside the control of the firm; and a one-sided component
which captures the effect of technical inefficiency relative to the
stochastic frontier. Measures of allocative efficiency can be
obtained from the residual of the first order conditions from cost
minimization.
Results from estimation of those models indicate that: (a) all
three types of ownership structures suffer from some degree of
inefficiency;

(b) estimations of long run models rank CO as the

most efficient ownership structure; the difference between CO vs PR
and PU is important and statistically significant, moreover, measures
of inefficiencies of PR and PU are not significantly different; (c)
estimation of

short run models produces

ambiguous results; the

stochastic frontier short run cost function puts PR as the most
efficient ownership structure while the system of equations shows
identical inefficiency measurement for PR and CO with PU having the
highest level of Inefficiency;

(d) total inefficiency is composed

mostly of technical inefficiency for PR, PU, CO; (e) when efficiency
measurement is compared for small and large plants, total inefficien
cy of large plants is nearly twice as much as inefficiency of small
plants.
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FIRST CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION
Over the last 20 years economists have been increasingly focusing
their attention upon the nature of the firm. Even though most econo
mists are basically familiar vith the classical textbook definition
of the firm> the renewed attention towards the nature of the firm
brought into light concepts such as property rights, contracts among
agents,

transaction costs and efficiency. Alchian and Demsetz in

their seminal paper (1972) argued that the ownership structure
characterizing the entrepreneurial firm is endogeneous and has
emerged to minimize the shirking problem facing all teams of produc
tion because of the transaction costs encurred to guarantee that
contracts among parties involved will be respecte*. However, numerous
types of organizations emerge and survive in market economies; aside
from the traditional firms (the entrepreneurial firm), one can find
modern corporations, multinational firms, regulated private firms,
various types of partnerships, cooperatives, non profit organiza
tions, publicly-owned firms, etc.. Very little is known about the
nature of those firms; that is, how do they fit within the competiti
veness of market economies, and more specifically, how does their
structure of property rights relate to various measures of efficien
cy? Large sectors of the economy are characterized by the presence of
different ownership structures, the agribusiness industry and the
banking industry,

for example,

are two Important sectors where

private firms (often regulated) and cooperative firms compete with

each other on a large scale. Other sectors such as transportation,
telecommunications and energy are characterized by the presence
of public firms, private firms and cooperatives. Since most econo
mists would argue that the economic system alms at an efficient
allocation and use of scarce resources, the comparative efficiency of
various organizational forms is an important issue to be considered
since they are characterized by a different structure of property
rights. This structure is thought to be related to efficiency since
it affects the incentives to allocate resources to their most
productive use, and the extent of exchange taking place in the
economy.
The electric industry offers interesting features with respect to
the central issue of this research. This industry encompasses several
ownership types: private utilities (regulated), cooperatives, federal
systems, and municipal utilities. The relative importance of each
ownership type is as follows:

the privately owned electricity

generation accounts for approximately 77% of the total net generation
In the United States compared to the publicly owned electricity
generation which accounts for 21% of the total net generation, and
less than 3% for the rural electric cooperatives (Sowell, 1978, p.
1). The importance of those ownership types varies with respect to
the segment of the Industry under scrutiny, but only the generating
segment is of interest to us in this research. The primary energy
sources for generating electricity are: coal (45%), oil (17%), gas
(18%), hydro (15%), nuclear (5%) (Scott,

1976, p. 24). Only the

conventional steam-electric power plants burning coal, oil, or

natural gas to produce heat which is used in converting water to high
pressure steam will be considered. These fossil-fuel steam-elec
tric plants dominate power production in the industry, and contribute
to approxlmatly 80% of the total generation (Scott, 1976, p. 27). All
ownership forms operate fossil-fuel steam-electric plants. Moreover,
data on those plants are readily available and published yearly
by the Federal Power Commission.
The central issue of this research is the comparative efficiency of
various ownership structures. That issue will be addressed using the
electricity industry because of the range of ownership types produ
cing electricity using the same technology;

each ownership type

operates a sufficiently large number of plants to allow statistical
analysis to be conducted.
There have been few studies to date which addressed this issue of
cost difference between ownership structures in electric Industry.
Meyer (1975), Pescatrice and Trapani (1980), Dilorenzo and Robinson
(1982) all estimated a cost function with a dummy variable accoun
ting for ownership structure. Their results indicated that publicly
owned electric utilities were more efficient than privately-owned
electric utilities. Using a different methodology, a non-frontier
cost function, Sowell (1978) concluded that private utilities were
more efficient than public utilities. All those studies show methodo
logical limitations; the use of a dummy variable model is based on
the concept of an average function which does not represent the most
efficient technology;

it measures a combination of random shocks,

technical and allocative Inefficiencies, and it is not capable of

discriminating between them; furthermore, it implies that one of the
ownership forms considered is efficient. Sowell's research concluded
on comparative efficiency based on a comparison of average and
marginal costs calculated for each ownership structure. His results
are questionable since he did not control for technology differences
across ownership types. Furthermore, they are contradictory since
he claimed that both ownership forms showed duality between produc
tion and cost function (Implying a cost minimizing behavior), but at
the aame time they showed allocative inefficiency.
The attenuation of the structure of property rights of each
ownership structure along with their Incentive and enforcement costs
of monitoring is discussed in chapter two. The empirical models
estimated on plant data from the electric utility Industry, and used
to measure and compare efficiency of those ownership structures are
discussed in chapters three and four. They are comprised of : (1) a
stochastic frontier function; (2) a functional form characterizing
the underlying technology using a Cobb-Douglas production function;
(3) an objective function characterizing the behavior of the various
organizational forms where all organizational forms are assumed to be
cost minimlzers; (4) the models to be estimated which are a long run
and short run production and cost functions;

(5) the estimation

is done with numerical techniques using MLE and Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm. Such a methodology is appropriate because it provides
estimates of absolute measures of technical and allocative ineffi
ciencies for each organizational form.

Results on measures of

technical and allocative efficiencies for each ownership structure

are presented in chapter five. Our results Indicate that all three
organizational forms are inefficient to a certain degree. Furthermo
re* most models estimated Indicate that cooperatives are most
efficient compared to private regulated and public utilities.
Differences,

over mean

inefficiency,

among public and private

regulated are not statistically significant. Moreover, estimates of
total inefficiency are mostly comprised of technical inefficiency
rather than allocative inefficiency.
The choice of an appropriate methodology to addr.ess this issue is
of great importance. Among the models available, and reviewed in
chapter three, we have selected the stochastic frontier model. From
such a model, which can be used with a limited number of functional
forms encompassing a production function, cost function as well as a
system of equations, we derived information on absolute measures of
technical, allocative and total cost inefficiencies for each owner
ship structure. Moreover,

those estimates of various measures of

inefficiencies have statistical properties allowing to test their
statistical significance.
The debate over the efficiency of various organizational forms in
the electric industry has been going on for almost a century. In
1907, the committee on Public Policy of the National Electric Light
Association reported that:
«the subjects of municipal ownership and public regulation
and control of public utilities are intimately connected
with each other. Neither can be adequately discussed without
reference to the other. Indeed, one is the alternative to the
other. Municipal ownership is demanded largely because of the

absence of proper public regulation and control. Public
regulation and control, if efficient, removes the necessity
or excuse for municipal ownership by securing fair treatment
for the public (Heilman, 1982, p. 13).»
The performance of the electric power industry is still very much a
controversial issue:
«fifty years ago vigorous debate centered on whether the
role of government in this industry should be increased,
with public enterprise, replacing regulated private enter
prise. Currently,

in the wake of deregulation in other

sectors of the economy, a central issue is whether the role
of government in electric power should be reduced, with
market

forces

replacing

government

regulation as

guarantor of acceptable industry performance

the

(Joskow and

Schmalensee, 1985, p. 5).»
Therefore, the analysis of the efficiency of the different organiza
tional forms ought to be very Important for policy matters.

SECOND CHAPTER
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INCENTIVE STRUCTURE, AND EFFICIENCY

1- Introduction
Two key demands are placed on economic organizations to be effi
cient (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972 p. 778):
(1) metering Input productivity
(2) metering revards
A specific reward system is needed to stimulate a particular
productivity response. The property rights approach focuses on
such a system of penalty-reward and its link with efficiency.
In the electricity generating industry we find three different
types of organizational forms: the privately-owned electric utilities
(PR), the publicly-owned electric utilities (PU), and the consumerowned cooperative utilities (CO). Those various organizations can be
distinguished on the basis of their property rights structure.
Incentives of different parties involved; owners, customers, politi
cians, managers, input owners (other than stockholders), have to be
assessed in relation with each given property rights structure.
Enforcement is crucial to link a specific system of property
rights,

and incentive,

to a particular productivity response.

High enforcement costs result in departure from the productlonpossibility and utility-possibility frontier (Pejovich, p. 344).
A proper definition and a presentation of the content of property
rights is given in the second section of this chapter. In the third

section we focus on the specific penalty-reward structure attached
to each organizational form Identified in the electricity generating
industry. A comparison of those structures will be conducted on the
basis of:
(1) their property rights (attenuation of),
(2) the incentives of the various parties Involved,
(3) the monitoring activities required to assure the respect of
these rights (enforcement),
(4) the impact of the attenuation of property rights on efficiency.
Finally, a comparison of the various penalty-reward

and their

enforcement activities, will be conducted on the basis of their
impact on efficiency.
2- Definition of property rights
Property rights can be defined as the effective right to do things,
and the effective claim to rewards as a result of this action
(Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972 p. 342). Three elements are recognized
as characterizing the content of property rights:
(1) the right to use the asset (usus); i.e. exclusivity,
(2) the right to appropriate returns from the asset (usus fructus).
It is the user's right to appropriate yield from an asset, and
to bear the consequences from changes in the value of an asset,
but not to sell or to change its qualities; i.e. appropriabili
ty*
(3) the right to change the asset's form and/or substance (abusus).
Itimplies the right to legally transfer all rights;
transferability.

i.e.

Enforcement costs are crucial in establishing exclusivity* appro
priability and transferability of property rights. Therefore,

the

costs of negotiating, contracting and enforcing the exchange are an
important characteristic of property rights.
Since every contract means an exchange of some bundle of property
rights, the attenuation reduces the set of opportunity choices of the
contracting parties and affects the allocation of resources.
Attenuation interferes with two major propositions in economic
theory:
(1) scarce resources tend to be allocated to those uses where
they are expected to be the most productive,
(2) the extent of exchange depends upon the initial amount of
goods in the possession of individuals and their marginal rates
of substitution.
The definition of property rights has focused on its content, its
fundamental characteristics, its attenuation with respect to the main
propositions of economics, and the costs of enforcing those rights.
The next section will focus on those aspects of the definition with
respect to the entrepreneurial firm as a polar case, the privatelyowned electric utilities, the publicly-owned electric utilities, and
the consumer-owned cooperative electric utilities.
3- Description and comparison of various property rights structures.
In the property rights approach, attention is concentrated on the
objectives of the various Individuals involved in the organization.
Different structures of property rights will lead to different
penalty-reward, and hence determine the choices that are opened

10
to decision makers. 1 An analysis of Che various structures of
property rights requires both a definition of the utility function
that reflects the preferences of the decision makers, and the actual
set of options that are attainable by the decision makers.
The comparison of various structures (the entrepreneurial firm Is
added as a polar case) requires that we Identify the different
principals and agents Involved in the decision making process, and
establish their incentives^. The incentives of each principal and
agent will have to be described with respect to the penalty-reward
attached to each structure of property rights. The incentives will be
influenced by the different attenuations of the property rights.
Those attenuations will characterize the organizations as a limiting
factor for the principals and agents in the pursuit of their own self
interest. They will also affect the enforcement costs of property
rights, allowing agents more room for discretionary behavior.
3.1 Entrepreneurial firm (polar case)
We classify the entrepreneurial firm as a polar case because it
is thought to have none of the attenuations on property rights that
affect the other three organizational forms (PR, PU, CO).
The firm, which is perceived as a nexus of contractual arrange
ments between input owners,

is characterized by a non separable

^Jensen and Meckling (1979, p. 472) state that the production of the
firm will depend on the specification of rights and laws or rule of
the game governing contracting. The relevant aspects of the contrac
ting and property rights system within which the firm operates,
play an Important role in motivating self-interest to achieve the
physically possible output.
^An agency relationship is defined as: a contract under which one or
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some
decision authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308)
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production function.

With positive transaction costs (the cost of

detecting, policing, monitoring and measuring Input performances)
each Input owner will be Induced to take more leisure time than when
these costs are zero. Because of positive transaction costs, shirking
becomes a viable activity.
Alchlan and Demsetz (1972, p. 782) argue that the entrepreneurial
firm, with its specific bundle of property rights,

arises as a

response to reduce shirking by constraining input owners to respect
the terms of their contracts with the central party (the entrepre
neur) , who specializes as a monitor to check the input performances
of the team members. To assure that the central party performs his
monitoring task without shirking, he will be allowed to:
(1) measure input performance,
(2) apportion rewards,
(3) appropriate the net earnings of the team, net of payments
to other inputs.
(4) terminate or revise contracts among input owners participa
ting as team members.
The content of the property rights structure of the entrepreneur
ial firm can be rewritten with respect to the definition given in the
previous section. The entrepreneur holds an exclusive right to use
the assets since he represents the central party common to all input
owners. He holds full claim on rewards by being allowed to appropria
te the net earnings of the team, the residual. Finally, he holds full
transferability rights since he can revise or terminate contracts
among Input owners. All fundamental characteristics of property
rights are present in entrepreneurial firms: (1) exclusivity in the

12
use of

the Inputs,

(2) appropriability of rewards, and (3) full

transferability of those rights.

The property rights structure

characterizing the entrepreneurial firm Is said to be complete.
The different parties involved with the entrepreneurial firm
include: risk bearers (stock owners), managers, other input owners
(labor, leased equipments, borrowed capital, etc.), customers^. The
two functions of the central party, risk bearing and management
of resources, are fulfilled by the entrepreneur^ who will seek to
maximize his objective function. Other input owners will also seek to
maximize their own objective functions which are different from that
of the management and risk bearer^.
may Include non pecuniary goods such, as

Their objective functions
on the job consumption

of

leisure time and respect as well as monetary Income. This Implies
agency costs in carrying out the contracts agreed upon among input
owners.^ Non pecuniary income consumed by the agent, but not agreed
upon by the principal in the contract,

reduces profits of the

^Customers are considered since they contract with the central party
to buy output from the team of production. By seeking to satisfy
their own interest they will play a central role in the overall
incentive structure of the entrepreneurial firm.
^The management represents the one party who is common to all the
contracts of the joint inputs, and who has the right to renegotiate
any input's contract Independently of contracts with other Inputs.
The risk bearer holds the residual claim and has the right to sell
his central contract and his residual status owner. (Fama, 1980 p.
288)
Sjensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) state that: if both parties of
the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason to
believe that the agent will not always act in the best interest of
the principal .
6Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) state that: it is generally
impossible for the principal or the agent to ensure, at zero cost,
that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal's
viewpoint .
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entrepreneurial firm affecting the oppportunity set of the principal.
The monitoring activities? are required to enforce the bundle of
property rights attached to the entrepreneurial firm. The principal
(the entrepreneur) will enforce his rights to maximize utility up to
the point where marginal gains of monitoring equals marginal costs of
such activities. He derives his incentive to carry his monitoring
activities from his full exclusivity, appropriability and transfe
rability over the assets.
In the following sections, it will be shown that all attenuation
ofrights will reduce rewards that can be appropriate from monitoring
and may increase the costs of monitoring. The results will be a set
of expectations regarding the relative efficiencies of various
organizational forms.
3.2 Privately-owned regulated electric utility (PR)
Property rights of the PR are attenuated because

this organiza

tional form shows separation of ownership from control. The risk
bearer keeps the right to appropriate the net earnings as well as the
right

to sell all those rights. However, managers are given the

rights, by the principals, to measure input performance, apportion
rewards, and revise or terminate contracts among contracting parties.
This attenuation reduces the ability of the owners to control the
decisions made by the managers. Further attenuation results from the
extensive regulation to which PR is subjected.
Each utility has been granted a monopoly franchise to construct
facilities and provide power to a specified service territory. In

^Monitoring of contract agreements can be performed directly through
budgets, policies, operating rules, ect.. It can also be performed
indirectly through various input and product markets.

return for this monopoly power, utilities have ceded to regulatory
authorities control over entry and exit from the business, over the
rates that can be charged to consumers and over the amounts of
profits that can be earned. This regulatory authority is exercised at
two levels; the wholesale market, or sales between utilities, and the
retail market, or sales to ultimate consumers. In general, federal
authorities regulate the wholesale market, and the states regulate
retail rates (Fenn, 1984, pp. 12-14). All activities of PR electric
utilities outside federal jurisdiction are subject to state regula
tion. This regulatory authority is generally assigned to a state
public service or public utility commission. At present, 11 states
have elected utility commissions, while the others have appointed
commissions. In addition to authority over retail rates, most state
utility commissions have the authority to: (1) initiate financial and
management audit, (2) set company performance standards, (3) esta
blish automatic rate adjustment mechanisms,

(4) and provide for

consumer representation during regulatory proceedings. Many also have
jurisdiction over such matters as accounting procedures, mergers and
dispositions of property,

financing arrangements, power plants

and transmission line siting and utility expansion plans (Fenn, 1984,
p. 14)
Property rights of PR are affected by regulation. The exclusive
use of the assets is being attenuated through the obligation to
operate as a franchised monopoly and to meet demands in legally
defined service territories. It also is attenuated by the regulation
over wholesale sales and power pooling arrangements. Price regulation
affects the right to appropriate returns from the assets. Transfers-

bility is also affected since decisions about plant expansion, type
of generation or merger, are subject to regulation. Those attenua
tions affect the owner's expectations about the use to which he can
put the assets since they make it more difficult to reallocate
resources to more productive uses. They also affect the value of the
assets to the owners. Finally,

they create limitations on the

owner'8 right to change the form, place or substance of an asset, and
to transfer all of his rights to others at mutually acceptable
prices.
The different parties involved with the PR are: risk bearers
(stock holders), consumers, managers, other input owners
leased equipments,

borrowed capital,

(labor,

ect.), commissioners and

politicians. Each of those parties will be maximizing its own utility
function subject

to the organization as a limiting factor. The

attenuated property rights structure means that stock holders have
limited rights over the assets because of regulation and separation
of ownership from control. The regulatory commission may hold a large
share of the property rights; and voters (consumers) control those
rights through the political process, therefore, becoming one of the
principals, along with the stock holders.
The overall structure of incentives is influenced by all these
contracting parties. Stock holders are motivated by profits, but
regulation limits their return on Investment

to a fair rate of

return. The incentives of stock holders are reduced to zero after
rate of return becomes effective since increased efficiency on the
part of team members could not be appropriated or transferred.
Consumers are interested in minimum prices and Increased efficiency

in Che use of resources. Their marginal gains from increased effi
ciency is therefore positive. Managers are influenced by the perfor
mance of the firm since it can be correlated to their opportunity
wage. The evaluation of their performance can be accomplished
indirectly by the managerial market, and directly by the board of
directors. However, after the rate of return is effective, managers
can appropriate potential profits at zero cost to stock holders.
Managers are induced to consume non pecuniary goods such as larger
staffs, larger gross assets, luxurious offices, less efficient but
more desirable employees, etc.. Such consumption goes against the
objectives of the principals since it deviates from the pattern that
would ensure profit maximization or cost minimization. Managers may
also lobby members of the regulatory commission about what are
prudent costs, enhancing their potential consumption of non pecuniary
goods. Only consumers would be affected. Non-capital input owners
will also seek to maximize their own objective functions, which may
be different

from those of the managers or owners. On the job

consumption may be included in their objective functions and attenua
tes tie exclusivity and appropriability terms of the contract agreed
upon by the parties. Politicians can also have their opportunity wage
influenced by the performance of PR to the extent that it is recogni
zed that they are not properly performing their task as monitors. But
it will be even more difficult to correlate performances of politi
cians to this single efficiency issue. Therefore, assuming effective
rate of return regulation,
mostly on the consumers.

incentives for efficiency will depend
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The enforcement of the contracts among the team members is done
by the principals (stock holders, consumers) over the agents (politi
cians, commissioners, managers), by the agents (politicians, commis
sioners) over the managers, and by the managers over the other
Input owners.
Stock holders have a strong Interest In the existence of a finan
cial market which prices the firm's securities efficiently. By having
partial transferability rights over their ownership of PR, stock
holders can indirectly monitor performances of the team of produc- .
tion. However, regulation affects the property rights structure of
the firm through legal restraints on the allowable magnitude of the
residual, limiting the ability to fully capitalize the future value
of current decisions. This attenuation of property rights reduces
I

the incentives of stock holders to monitor the performance of the
team and to enforce the contracts among input owners and the central
party. It also limits the efficiency of the financial market itself
as a source of indirect monitoring. The market price for securities
of private utilities is affected by the limitation over allowed rates
of return. Potential expected profits of the firm would affect the
security price under normal circumstances, but who would know if
increased efficiency has not been pursued when profit

is being

regulated? More important, stock holders would not have any incentive
in further specializing as monitors since they have no possibility of
appropriating expected profit from such activities after the allowed
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rate

of return has been pald.& Voters (consumers) will indirec

tly control the performance of the team of production using the
political process. By electing politicians who are committed to cost
efficiency, voters can influence the decision process of the regula
tory commissions. However, because of the free rider problem consu
mers are expected to shirk their task of becoming well

informed

with respect to efficiency of electric utilities and performance of
politicians, and there may be less than socially optimal monitoring
on their part. A final source of indirect monitoring comes from the
managerial labor market. The performance of managers can be linked
to their opportunity wage
However,

through the managerial labor market.

the capacity of managerial labor market in evaluating

performance of managers should be impaired the same way the financial
market is; how do we know if managers are not performing optimally
after rate of return regulation has been reached. Therefore, even
though managers may not be seeking profit maximization or cost
minimization

it is unlikely that their opportunity wage will be

affected.
Direct monitoring will be performed by the board of directors
elected by the stock holders.

They will directly evaluate

the

performance of managers in carrying out the contracts among input
owners. The incentives of the board are likely to be the same as

®We could envision the cost of monitoring the performance of the team
as being function of the efficiency of the financial market until the
allowed rate of return has been reached. After that point there is an
expected increase in monitoring costs since information over poten
tial increased efficiency has no value to stock holders and is not
likely to be accounted for by the financial market. Interested
parties would have to rely on direct monitoring to find out about
potential increase in efficiency not captured by the team of product
ion.

Chose of the stock holders, and they are likely to be limited the
same way. Therefore, stock holders will tolerate discretionary
behavior on the part of management since it is virtually costless (to
managers and stock holders) to transfer potential profits over and
above the allowable rate of return. Stock holders will monitor
managers to the point where marginal costs of monitoring equals
marginal gains of such activities. After the allowable rate of return
has been paid, marginal gains to stock holders virtually fall to zero
while the marginal costs Increase because of the limitations imposed
on the indirect monitoring activity performed by the financial
market. The regulatory commission will also be directly monitoring
the performances of the production team. Their incentives come
from the political process. They may have access to some of the
information that the board of directors has,

information that

managers have to provide by law and when asked for it. But it is
unlikely that they would have as much information on the private
ly-owned utility than the board of directors has, since the regulato
ry commission is specifically asking for information when it is
conducting hearings while the board is actively involved in the
operations of the PR. Furthermore, it is not in the best interest of
the PR to provide more information than is required by the regulatory
commission. However, the possibility of comparing the performances of
various utilities allows for the indentificatlon of sources of

Inefficiencies at low cost.9 Finally, managers will be monitoring
activities of other members of the team. Regulation allows more
freedom for managers to have discretionary behavior as long as they
perform well enough to pay the allowed rate of return. Other sources
of monitoring, such as direct market competition, are not likely to
be of much help since private utilities are franchised monopolies.
Furthermore, the possibility of a take over should be limited since
the Federal government regulates such activities. However, potential
competition may be a positive force.
In conclusion, attenuation of property rights of PR affects the
incentive structure by reducing potential marginal gains of the
principals and agents involved as well as Increasing the enforcement
costs. When rate of return regulation is effective, Incentives of
stock holders fall virtually to zero. Appropriability of consumers is
attenuated.

Furthermore,

consumers have to face high enforcement

costs to appropriate residuals (cost of production - minimum cost of
production) since they have to rely on two sets of agents to do so.
Finally, the regulatory commission is arbitrating among various
interests of consumers, stock holders and managers, further increa
sing the enforcement costs of consumers to appropriate more residuals
in the form of reduced prices. Consumers have almost no transferabi
lity other than reducing the amount of electricity bought. Only stock

^Joskowand Schmalensee (p. 21) state that: The availability of such
comparative statistics could make regulation more effective. And if
the regulatory authorities made extensive use of such comparisons,
this form of competition could represent an important implicit source
of rivalry between monopoly firms. Despite the prominent role that
yardstick competition has long played in discussions of public policy
toward electric power, until recently regulatory agencies do not
appear to have made much use of comparative information.

holders can transfer claims over the assets of PR. Therefore*
attenuation of property rights affects the efficiency of indirect
control since the financial and managerial markets will be less
effective after rate of return regulation has been reached while the
political market may produce less than optimum monitoring because of
the free rider problem. Since regulation eliminates much of market
competition*

there may be less indirect monitoring by potential

competitors than for the entrepreneurial firm. Efficiency of direct
monitoring is also likely to be affected since the board of directors
has reduced incentives to further control activities of managers
while the regulatory commission is likely to intervene at times of
hearings and based on informations mostly given to them by the
managers of PR.
3.3 Publicly-owned electric utilities (PU)
Municipal systems are usually run by the local city council or an
independent board elected by voters or appointed by city officials
(Fenn, 1984, p.10). Some of the state commissions are empowered to
regulate municipal electric systems. However, they usually do not
exercise all their powers over municipal systems because of inadequa
te staff and funds and the willingness to invade the autonomy of
municipal governments (Power committee, 1948, pp. 425-426).
The PU shows separation of ownership from control, but contrary
to PR, further attenuations of its property rights are not caused by
regulation. The main difference comes from the fact that ownership is
obtained with residency. Voters cannot buy or sell portions of stocks
in the government; i.e. transferability of ownership cannot be done
through the financial market. Residents who want to sell their shares
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of Che utilities have to migrate from the area, reduce their quantity
of input bought, or sell the entire utility to a third party.
Transferability of ownership (to a third party) could be translated
in terms of reduced taxes or allocated to other uses within the
municipalities. Transferability is further affected by the limited
rights of owners to sell their assets; they cannot directly sell
their claims on future cash flows. Even though the residual is
likely to be zero by law, the potential gains from increased effi
ciencies are the reduced costs to residents, so appropriability of
rewards from actions that would lead to increased efficiencies are
well

identified. Moreover, price of electricity is likely to be

charged close to its cost, so that consumers would notice the impact
of improved efficiency. Appropriability is limited since residents
can benefit from increased efficiency only proportionally to their
level of transaction with the utility. Only if they benefit from
the assets for a sufficiently long period will they be able to
appropriate future expected benefits from current decisions.
The different parties involved with the PU are: owners/users
(residents), politicians, managers and other input owners. As before,
each of those parties will be expected to maximize its own objective
function. The incentives of the residents are derived from the use
of electricity. Users would benefit from a price reduction following
an increase in efficiency of the production team. Since politicians
are elected to efficiently allocate resources in the public domain,
the inefficient use of public resources is likely to reduce their
chances of being reelected. Moreover, like managers and the manage
rial labor market, politicians who are not seeking reelection have to

consider the possibility that their opportunity wage would be
affected by bad performances as managers of public resources.
Managers of PU may have much the same objectives as their counter
parts in PR, where pecuniary as well as non pecuniary income enter
their objective function. As in the PR, attenuation of property
rights allows them discretionary behavior, such as larger staff, less
productive but more desirable employees,

larger assets, etc..

Attenuation reduces potential penalties for not seeking more effi
cient projects, for not monitoring other input owners properly, etc..
Potential penalties come from evaluation of their performance by
politicians and residents, and from possible impact of bad perfor
mances on their opportunity wage. Other input owners also have
pecuniary as well as non pecuniary goods entering their objective
functions and therefore, can be expected to shirk on the terms of
the contracts among parties.
The overall structure of incentives derived from the property
rights of PU is towards increased efficiency because of user/owner
objective of cost minimization. However, attenuated rights of these
principals allow some discretionary behavior on the part of the
agents, politicians, managers and other input owners; so deviations
from the patterns of cost minimization are to be expected.
The enforcement of the contracts among the team members is done
by the principals (residents) over the agents (politicians, mana
gers), by tbe politicians over the managers, and by the managers over
the other input owners. Indirect monitoring by the residents will be
performed using the political system. By electing politicians, who
nominate directory board members, committed to efficiency in the use

of resources, voters will indirectly monitor the activities of the
team of production.

In order to perform their monitoring task

properly, voters need to know about preferences of politicians over
efficiency issues. Furthermore, they need

information about

the

relative efficiency in PU; i.e. in producing electricity in order to
evaluate the performances of politicians. Because politicians are
elected over a wide variety of issues, they will unlikely monitor
utilities perfectly. Furthermore, the free rider problem suggests
that voters are likely to shirk their task of being well informed on
preferences of politicians or on politicians' records with respect to
efficiency of electricity generation. Indirect monitoring by resi
dents can also be performed by observing areas serviced by other
utilities.
Politicians and the board of directors of the PU will be directly
controlling the activities of managers. Information will be obtained
from the management and other input owners; but compared to regula
tors of the PR, politicians and directors may not have as much
information about several utilities. However, just as in the case of
the PR they may have Information coming from potential competitors.
Unlike the regulatory commission, the board of directors of the PU
will be actively involved in supervising activities of managers, and
they will have to consider interests of the consumers.
The managerial labor market will control managers to the extent
that their performance affects their opportunity wage. But there is
no reason to expect that managerial labor markets will pressure
managers of the PU any more than those of the PR.
In summary, important aspects of the property rights structure
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are attenuated, thus affecting the incentive structure dominated by
consumers'

objectives.

Because of limited appropriability and

transferability, consumers cannot expect full rewards from actions
that would enhance efficiency. Rights are further limited by the
enforcement structure. The political system is likely to be ineffi
cient with respect to utility alone since politicians can shirk their
task of monitoring efficient use of resources within PU. They are
elected over many issues and for a four-year period.

Furthermo

re, voters are likely to shirk their task of being properly informed
about such issue as efficient electricity production.
3.4 Consumer-owned cooperative utilities (CO)
The rural electric cooperative is an incorporated association of
neighbouring farmers and other rural residents, organized democrati
cally for the purpose of supplying electricity to its members at the
lowest cost made possible through mutual self-help and the Rural
Electrification Administration's

(REA)

financing and guidance.

Electric cooperatives are almost entirely financed by the federal
government who closely supervises and assists the establishment and
the operation of their businesses (Power committee, 1948, p. 451).
The contract, which governs the relations between the REA and the
cooperative after the system is in operation provides REA with the
needed information to supervise all major aspects of the operating
policy. Operations are supervised through ten (10) regional supervi
sors, and co—ops must submit annual and monthly operating statements
and statistics. The REA has no congressional mandate to regulate the
retail rates of cooperatives, but the cooperatives must charge rates
sufficient

to pay taxes, maintenance costs and other operating
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expenses, Co meet principal and interest charges when due, and to
provide a reasonable reserve for working capital. In practice, REA
virtually determines the retail rate policy of the cooperatives
(Power committee, 1948, p. 455). In most states, cooperatives are not
subject to state authority (Power committee, p. 460).
Therefore, a cooperative is a non-profit economic entity, usually
found operating at the retail level which is owned and managed by its
customers. While cooperative members hold shares in their cooperati
ves,

these shares do not generate dividends for profit, but are

reinvested into the operation of the business as patronage capital,
which is often credited to individual members. Cooperatives operate
on a one-person, one-vote basis and the members elect directors from
their own ranks' (Doyle,

1979, p. 2). The rural electric system

is a two level operation, comprised of some 980 local distribution
co-ops and approximatly 60 generating and transmission co-ops
(G+T's). Local co-ops distribute electricity to their own rural
customers, while G+T's generate and/or transmit electricity primarily
for local distribution co-ops, which are typically members of a
G+T's or a co-op federation (Doyle, 1979, p. 15). Co-op democracy is
a representative democracy, and at each level of co-op decision-ma
king, the local co-op is represented by one of its board members or
its directors. Local co-ops have typically at least one of their
board members on the boards of the state rural electric association
and the G+T system to which they belong (Doyle, 1979, p. 203)*0.

l°Doyle goes further by saying that many of the local representa
tives on the G+T boards depend on the G+T staff expertise and
management assessements of policy issues to help them decide how to
vote at boards' meetings (1979, p. 203).

Cooperatives are private organizations with open membership.
However, ownership of a cooperative is related to the usage of its
services. An ownership share is paid in part with an initial fee
called social share. Further investments are made through undistribu
ted residuals; patronage capital on which members have individual
claims. This additional investment is related to the transactions
made by the members with the CO.
Even though there is no financial market for claims of the
cooperative shares, which will limit transferability, members have a
claim on cash flows contingent on being a user and they can appropri
ate expected increased efficiency through reduced price of electrici
ty. Appropriability over the cash flows of the CO. covers the full
price paid for electricity as well as the residual which is a
percentage over operating prices until all costs are accounted for.
Appropriability is limited to the level of transactions between the
cooperative and its members. Because ownership is limited to one
share, members cannot expect to appropriate

(full)

actions that would result in increased efficiency.

rewards from

However, appropr

iability is further attenuated because members will not be able to
bear the consequences of changes of forms and substances of the
assets, and the future consequences of improved management will not
be directly capitalized into present wealth of claim owners although
they may be capitalized into other assets, such as land values.
Unless they remain members long enough to use up the assets, they are
expected to suffer from the horizon problem related to their expected
termination (i.e. migration) date (as owner of a claim over the cash
flow of the co-op). Finally, the role played by the REA, even if it
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does not have a congressional mandate to regulate the rural electric
cooperatives, attenuates appropriability since It virtually determi
nes their retail rate policy. Ownership claim, comprised of a social
share and the patronage capital credited to members, can only be sold
back to the cooperative at nominal value, which attenuates transfera
bility over claims owned by members. The absence of financial market
forbids transfer of rights at market value. When members transfer
their ownership claim to the coop, they can act merely as consumers.
Transferability is further attenuated since the co-op cannot change
the form and/or substance of its assets without approval by the REA.
The principals for the CO are the members, and to a certain
degree the voters since the Federal government (representing the
voters) finances almost entirely their operations. The contract which
governs the relations between the co-op and REA covers all aspects of
their operations. The agents are the board of directors, the managers
and the REA officers (representing the Federal government). The
incentives of the members are derived from the use of electricity.
Cost of production will directly enter their objective function, as
will the size of the residual that can be distributed at the end of
the year. The board of directors consists of members as well, so they
should have much the same incentives as the members themselves. Aside
from the social value of the rural electrification program, voters
ought to be concerned with respect to the possible default in
cooperative loans since the Federal government is responsible for
almost all the money borrowed by the co-ops.
Managers and other input owners may have the same objective
functions as the managers of the PR and PU. The incentives influen

cing managers are related to their expectations with respect to their
opportunity wage determined In the managerial labor market. They are
also induced to consume non pecuniary goods as were managers of PR
and PU utilities. Bureaucrats from the REA agency also have an
objective function in which enters pecuniary as well as non pecuniary
income since they are managers for the Federal government.
The incentives derived from the co-op's property rights structure
are based on both electricity prices and potential residuals. Claims
over the assets, even though limited, will also influence members
since they can withdraw from the co-op and expect to be bought off.
The REA supervises the activities of the co-ops in order to reduce
risk of bankcruptcy. Their incentives might lean more toward suffi
cient revenues than minimum costs. Indirect control over the activi
ties of the team of production is rather limited. Since there is no
market to exchange the assets of the CO, members can only sell their
share to the co-op itself, or migrate. In the absence of migration
they still would have to buy electricity from the co-op since it is
most likely to be a franchised monopoly within a specific territory.
Since cooperatives are not regulated, members cannot delegate
indirect control of agents to politicians. They could sell off the
assets of the CO and divide the proceeds among themselves. Members
elect directors annually at a general assembly. They indirectly
control the agents by delegating their responsablllty to the direc
tors. Therefore, indirect monitoring is performed by a political
system where the politicians (directors) are elected every year over
a single issue; efficient allocation of resources. This may be a
major difference with respect to PU. Direct control is performed

mostly by directors who oversee the performance of managers. Informa
tion comes from the production team. The board may not have as much
comparative information as the regulatory commission, though informa
tion is available via the Federal Power Commission and the Rural
Electric Administration, but like the PU it has inside information
with respect to the activities of managers.

Furthermore,

direct

monitoring is performed by the bureaucrats of the REA who have
extensive powers over the operations of the co-ops. REA has informa
tion on a large number of utilities. The role played by the REA, as a
monitor, is a major difference between the CO vs the PR and the PU.
In conclusion, attenuation of property rights affects incentives
of consumers; appropriability is limited to the level of transactions
of members with the co-op, furthermore, it is limited since members
cannot appropriate expected future residuals unless

they remain

consumers long enough. Transferability is limited by the absence of
financial market and the obligation to sell off claims over the
assets of CO to the co-op at nominal value. Incentives of members are
centered on reduced prices. The role played by the REA is important
and will enhance the incentive structure of the co-op. Indirect
monitoring takes place through the political market; this political
market

is private since CO have open membership with democratic

representation. Board members are elected over a single issue every
year and control the activities of the CO directly. Monitoring is
also performed by the REA on a regular basis. The role of REA both in
the incentive structure (as lender) and the monitoring structure
seems to be a major difference with respect to PR and PU.
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4~ Comparison of efficiencies of organizational forms (PR, PU, CO)
4.1 Meaning of Efficiency
Efficiency is a complex concept:
«i£ is a statement about the performance of processes
transforming a set of inputs into a set of outputs. It is a
relative concept since the performance must be compared to
a standard*.
This standard will be strongly influenced by the characteristics of
the technology including all feasible physical possibilities. The
characteristics underlying a technology are best represented by:
(1) the scale effect;

the relative increase in output as all

Inputs are increased proportionally. The technology can show
increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale. If the
marginal rate of

technical substitution between Inputs

remains unchanged as output increases with input proportions
constant, we have a homothetlc technology.
(2) the substitution effect; the degree to which inputs can be
substituted for one another. It refers to the shape of the
Isoquants.
(3) the expansion path; it is defined as the locus of cost-mi
nimizing input combinations in input space for a given set of
input prices.
(4) the technical change; it is generally recognized that the
production technology changes over time. Technical change
will shift the production function, and the nature of the
shift will determine whether it has a neutral or non-neutral

^Forsund and Hjarmarsson (1974, p. 141)
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effect on the Inputs of the production process. A non-neutral
change means that one or more of the factor inputs has become
disproportionally more productive than the remaining inputs.
The concept of technical change requires a distinction between ex
ante and ex post technologies. The ex post technology represents a
specific technology in place, while the ex ante technology represents
the set of all available blueprints for equipment of different
design characteristics prior to installing a new piece of equipment.
The technical change is said to bet embodied when only the new
equipment can incorporate the most recent technology. It is said to
be disembodied when technology is influenced by phenomena like
learning by doing whereby productivity of old inputs are affec
ted.
Establishing a meaningful hypothesis as to which organizational
form is expected to be more efficient first requires a definition of
efficiency. Static measures of efficiency can be divided in three
categories:
(I) technical efficiency requires a firm to produce a maximum
level of output from a given input bundle^. The firm will
therefore be on its production frontier.
l^In general, two different measures of technology can be defined.
The first measure shows the ratio between the amounts of inputs
required to produce the observed output with frontier technology,
and the observed amount of input. This input saving measure shows
the relative reduction in the amount of inputs needed to produce the
observed output, with frontier technology, using the observed factor
production. A second measure is obtained by comparing the observed
output with the output obtained on the frontier using the same amount
of inputs. This output augmenting measure is the ratio between the
observed output and the potential output obtained by employing the
observed amounts of inputs in the frontier production. These two
measures will coincide in the case of linear homogeneity.
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(2) allocative efficiency requires a firm to utilize its inputs
in the right proportion, given input prices^. The firm is
operating on its least-cost expansion path.
(3) scale efficiency requires a firm to operate at the appro
priate scale level for a given vector of inputs^. The scale
level is appropriate when the size of the plant shows the
average short run cost curve tangent to the minimum point
on the long run average cost curve.
The frontier production function corresponds to maximum output
given by the technological possibilities at the time of installation
of the latest equipment. It is a planning frontier, or an ex ante
function. The actual possibilities for a plant at a given moment in
time are determined by the vintages of all the existing production
units. Therefore time Introduces problems in measuring efficiency in
two ways:
(1) A plant could be designed and utilized at its inception in
a manner in which there are neither technical nor allocative
inefficiencies;

i.e. it is on its planning frontier. At a

later time, it could be off the current frontier for two
reasons:

^Allocative efficiency is represented by the point of tangency
between an Isoquant and the relevant isocost line.
l^The measures of scale efficiency refers to the output augmenting
measure if the maximum average product is applied to the given scale,
it refers to input savings if a given output was produced at the
maximum average product. In order to control for technical ineffi
ciency, those measures compare the optimal plant scale to the
hypothetical output or input requirements if the firm was on its
frontier. For this reason, a constant returns to scale production
frontier would exhibit no scale inefficiencies.
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a) technical change shifted the frontier, so while the plant
may be on its ex ante frontier, it is not on the current
frontier.
b) factor prices may turn against the firm even if there is
no technical change. If technology is not putty-putty it
cannot readjust fully and allocative Inefficiency is
observed.
(2) There may be some optimal adjustment path in response to
changing technology and prices over time, determined by the
firm's objective function.
Even though we can do little to control for the second problem,
we can control for the first by considering only new plants and
specifying vintages.^
Recognizing the characteristics of technology in the electricity
generating industry is very important in order to be able to inter
pret

the various measures of inefficiencies. Technology used to

generate electricity is said to be of the putty-clay type1®. This is
important since as it is argued by Fuss and McFadden (1974 , p.
317-318),
<in the presence of significant flexibility efficiency
trade off, conventional econometric production functions
provide very little information on the structure of the ex

i^Fuss and McFadden (1974) suggest estimating models of the firm in
which an ex ante decision is made on plant design, based on expecta
tions about the environment to be faced ex post. (pp. 320-321). This
kind of model allows a recognition of the possibilities of a trade
off between flexibility and efficiency.
putty-clay technology can be represented by an ex ante design that
achieves static efficiency at some output, and fixes the quantities
of both capital and variable inputs in the ex post technology.
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ante best practice envelope curve, and may Indeed provide
misinformation. More fundamentally, we conclude that the
concept of a static best practice envelope curve characte
rizing the ex ante technology is inadequate, and In environ
ments where firms face considerable uncertainty and intertem
poral variation, irrelevant. It is in this case Impossible to
define meaningful isoquants in a static picture of one-period
production possibilities in which the flexibility-efficlency
trade off has no explicit representation.
If such is the case, then our standard of comparison to measure
efficiency has to be carefully interpreted even in dealing with data
representing ex ante technology.18
In a putty-clay world where some input substitution becomes
impossible until the next plant is built, changing prices of inputs
will make the firm appear to be allocatlvely Inefficient. However,
this may not be neccessarily the case. For example, we can't ignore
the cost of adjustment. Also managers could have Included such things
as flexibility-efficiency tradeoff in the planning frontier, or they

^Examples of flexibility-efficiency decision in production processes
are: (1) Electric utilities can build base load plants which have
higher capital cost, but lower operating cost, and represent the
lower cost technology for providing continuous output, or they can
build peak load plants. (2) They can also build thermal plants which
can be converted to use oil, gas or coal. These boilers increase
capital and maintenance costs and thus result in inefficient produc
tion if only one type of fuel is used throughout the life time of the
plant. (Fuss and McFadden, pp.311-312)
l^since we are interested in a comparative analysis of various orga
nizational forms, we can hypothesize that their ex ante and ex post
environments are sufficiently comparable to allow meaningful compari
sons. However, all comments about absolute inefficiencies with
respect to each organizational forms have to be very carefully inter
preted.

36
may expect changes In relative prices of inputs later and plan to be
allocatively inefficient in the early stages.
4.2 Attenuation of property rights and efficiency
As it has been stated earlier, the two major propositions of
economic theory are:
productive use,

(1) resources are allocated to their most

(2) and the extent of exchange depends upon the

initial amount of goods in the possession of individuals and their
marginal rate of substitution. Attenuation of property rights : (1)
affects the owner's expectation about the use to which he can put the
asset,

(2) affects the value of the assets to the owners and to

others, and consequently the terms of trade, (3) implies the existen
ce of limitations on the owner's right to change the form, place or
substance of an asset, and to transfer all of his rights to others at
mutually acceptable prices. When incentives are limited because of
attenuation of property rights, or because of high enforcement costs,
it is less likely that resource owners will be motivated to trade
optimally. Property rights are defined as one's effective right to do
things ((re)allocate resources to more productive uses), and one's
effective claim to rewards as a result of his action (affects the
MRSXy and therefore the extent of exchange). Attenuation of property

rights can be translated in terms of lack of incentives to meter
input productivity properly, or to apportion rewards accordingly. The
absence of correlation between input productivity and rewards will
leave the economic organization to be inefficient. High enforcement
costs will reduce the amount of monitoring for all level of incenti
ves from property rights, and shirking among resources owners will be
more viable. The value of goods (function of the bundle of property

rights attached to it) will be decreased, and less exchange will take
place.
The entrepreneur has exclusive rights to use the assets, full
claim on rewards, and full transferability. Therefore, he has full
incentives to monitor and to enforce contracts among members of the
team of production. Those rights will allow the entrepreneur to
maximize its utility function. He will enforce those rights directly
by observing and measuring performances of members of the team. He
will be forced to perform his monitoring task otherwise competitors
would cease opportunities and consumers would vote him out of the
market (or he would have to reduce the residual that he can appro
priate after all input owners have been paid).
The entrepreneurial firm produces maximum incentives to monitor
input performance (property rights are said to be complete) , and
reduces the enforcement costs of monitoring those activities. Since
entrepreneurs are utility maximizers,

they will be expected to

maximize the rewards from appropriability and transferability,
and therefore, correlate productivity and rewards

(to resource

owners). We can expect that resources will be allocated to their most
productive uses.
All three organizational forms presented earlier are not expected
to be efficient since they all suffer from attenuation of property
rights and high enforcement costs which affect the overall incentive
structure of, the principals and agents Involved.
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4.3 Comparative efficiency of PR, PU, CO
Table 1
Comparison of efficiency of PR, PU, CO
Summary
PR

PU

CO

INCENTIVES
1) Owners of PR when (CKz^l)
PU, CO
. exclusivity
. appropriability
. transferability
2) Consumers of PR, PU, CO
. exclusivity
. appropriability
. transferability

+
+

CONTROL
a) Indirect
1) Financial market (0<z<l)
2) Managerial labor market
3) Political market
b) Direct
1) Board of stock holders (0«cz<l)
vs directors of co-ops and
directors of municipal system
2) Regulation (Regulatory
commission vs REA)

+
+
+

+
+

+

+

+

-

A comparison of efficiency of those organizational forms is very
difficult to establish. All three forms show attenuation of their
property rights structures which impaires their overall incentive and
enforcement structures. From the summary table 1, it is seen that
incentives derived from the property rights structure for CO seem a
little stronger since members have more appropriability (the resi
dual) and transferability (the claims over social shares and undis
tributed residual). Looking at consumers (as principals)^,

their

incentives towards increased efficiency seem very much alike. From

l^We must recall that consumers of co-ops are also members while
consumers of PU are also residents.

the enforcement structure point of view, CO seems to come first
because its political market deals with a single issue while elec
tions are on a year basis. The main advantage however comes from the
control by the REA bureaucrats since these have to protect the
Federal Government from Co-op's default on loans, and are doing
so by supervising all aspects of cooperative's administration.
In concluding however, one has to emphasize the limitation of
such comparison because of the qualitative nature of the various
dimensions used to characterize each organizational form.

THIRD CHAPTER
LITERATURE REVIEW ON EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT OF EFFICIENCY
1. Introduc Cion
This chapter reviews the literature on empirical measurement
of efficiency. Several models have been proposed to measure efficien
cy. They can be categorized as follows: (1) deterministic non-parametric frontier, (2) deterministic parametric frontier, (3) determini
stic statistical frontier,

(4)

non-frontier efficiency models,
dummy variable model.

stochastic frontier model,

(5)

(6) total factor productivity,

(7)

Each of those models has advantages and

disadvantages. A discussion of those models with respect to the
objective of this study follows in section 2 and a review of empiri
cal results relevant to this study is made in section 3.
2. Quantitative measures of efficiencies : review of the various
models developed and used to test and measure efficiency
2.1

Deterministic non parametric frontier

Following Forsund et al. (1980, pp.8-9),
cFarrel's approach

is non-parametric in the sense that

he simply constructs the free disposal convex hull of
the observed
techniques.

input-output ratios by linear programming

It is not based on any explicit model of the

frontier or of the relationship of the observations to the
frontier*
Farrel's

(1957,

pp.254-255) measure of technical efficiency

is calculated from a best practice technology one can observe. The
efficient isoquant is derived from an efficient production function
obtained from observations of the Inputs and outputs of a number of

firms. Each firm is represented by a point on an isoquant diagram.
From the scatter diagram, the efficient isoquant is estimated, and
the pairs of points chosen are those for which the line joining them
satisfies the two following conditions; (1) the line must be downward
sloping, (2) no observed point must lie between it and the origin.
The isoquant represents the various combinations of the two factors
that a perfectly efficient firm might use to produce unit output. The
efficiency of a firm (represented by a point above the efficient
isoquant) is measured by comparing it with a hypothetical firm which
uses the factors in the same proportions. Farrel tested his technique
using U.S. agricultural data over 48 states with one output (cash
receipts from farming) and four Inputs (land, labor, material and
capital) each of these variables being represented as the input of a
particular factor per unit of output (1957, p.269). His results show
that 20% of the states are 100% efficient, 9% are between 90-100%
efficient, 30% are between 80-90% efficient, 25% are between 70-80%,
13% are between 60-70%, and 3% are between 50-60% efficient.
The advantage of Farrel's technique is that no functionnal form
has to be imposed on the data. The disadvantages are that constant
returns to scale (CRS) is restrictive, the extension to non-CRS
technologies is cumbersome, the frontier is particularly sensitive to
extreme observations and measurement error, and the estimates which
it produces have no stastitlcal properties.
2.2 Deterministic parametric frontier
I

Recognizing that the frontier production function forms the core
of microeconomic theory, Algner and Chu (1968) outline ah empirical
framework within which this frontier is observable. The authors
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define an industry

function which resembles Farrel's efficient

production function^.

Though they go further by estimating with

mathematical programming (linear and quadratic) a production function
for the firm that expresses the maximum output obtainable from the
input combination at the existing state of

technical knowledge.

Linear programming produces the envelope function by controlling the
disturbance term to be of one sign only. The objective function
appears as the summation of such disturbances and it is to be
minimized subject to the constraint that each residual be non-positii

ve.
Aigner and Chu start out with a Cobb-Douglas production function
as specified by Hildebrand and Liu (1965). They derive the criterion
function which they pose in a typical programming problem.2 Even
though they do not refer to measures of efficiency, the technical
efficiency of each observation can be computed directly from the
vector of residuals since u**lnf(x)-ln(y)

represents

technical

efficiency. Since their technique is based on the estimation of a
production function, it is Impossible to obtain an estimation of
allocative efficiency. Forsund and Hjalmarsson (1979) use a similar
approach with a different production function taken from Zellner and
Revankar (1969).

Presenting estimates of structural efficiency from

28 individual dairy plants during the period

1964-73

(Sweden),

*The industry production function is conceptually a frontier of
potential attainment for given input combinations. The production
function for any particular firm may conceptually be obtained from
the industry function in terms of the firm's ability to implement
optimal values of parameters in the industry. (Aigner and Chu, p.826)
^Aigner and Chu had only, as an objective, to derive a frontier
production function. They did not try to measure technical effi
ciency.
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Forsund and Hjalmarsson

(p.303)

show that the same output in

different years could have been produced by 57-70% of the observed
amounts of inputs

used.3

From basically the same framework, Timmer (1971) Introduced a
variant in deriving a probabilistic frontier model.
mathematical programming method

Since this

is thought to be sensitive to

outliers, he proposed to drop the most efficient observations from
the sample until estimated coefficients stabilised. Timmer used a
Cobb-Douglas production function and aimed at estimating technical
efficiency for U.S. agriculture from 1960 to 1967 across states. His
results indicate that 75% of the states had measured efficiencies
within 10% of the frontier. The least efficient state was less than
20% away from the frontier (pp.789-790).
The advantages of such a technique are the ability to characteri
ze frontier technology in a simple mathematical form and to accomoda
te non-CRS technologies. The disadvantages result in being restricted
to homogenous production functions and in the fact that the method
imposes a limitation on the number of observations that can be
technically efficient (only as many technically efficient observa
tions as there are parameters to be estimated). Also, the estimated
frontier is supported by a subset of the data and is therefore
extremely sensitive to outliers. Timmer has suggested discarding a
few observations until the estimation of the parameters has stablll-

3The estimate of structural efficiency is represented by the distance
of the average plant to the frontier function for given output. It is
a measure of the relative reduction in the amount of Inputs needed to
produce the observed average industry output with frontier function
technology with the observed average factor proportions and size of
plant (Forsund and Hjalmarsson, 1979, p.303).
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zed.

The estimates which this method produce have no statistical

properties $o no inferential results can be obtained. Finally, we
cannot obtain a measure of allocative efficiency since the model is
based on the estimation of a production function.
2.3 Deterministic statistical frontier model
Afriat (1972) was the first to introduce statistical analysis by
making some assumptions about the distribution of the error structu
re. He estimated a Cobb-Douglas production function (In y ■ In f(x)
-u) where the residual term (u>0) was assumed to be independently and
identically distributed (X was assumed to be exogenous). Afriat
proposed a two-parameter beta distribution for u and estimated the
model using the maximum likelihood method (MLE). With this technique,
it is only possible to obtain a mean efficiency for the sample of
firms, whereas the linear programming technique permitted a measure
of efficiency for each firm. The estimated mean of u becomes the mean
technical efficiency. When a specific distribution is assumed for u,
the parameters of this distribution can be derived analytically from
its higher moments and estimated consistently from the moments of the
residuals. Using Aigner and Chu's statewide data on the U.S. primary
metals industry, Greene (1980) estimated a translog cost function and
its cost shares using annual time series data (1947-1971) for the U.S
manufacturing sector. He used MLE and a Gamma density function. His
results

indicateo a mean technical inefficiency of about 2.2Z

and no systematic allocative Inefficiency (pp.110-111).
The disadvantages of this technique include the fact that
different assumed distributions for u lead to different estimates and
we have no «a priori* strong arguments for any particular distrl-

V
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bution. Furthermore, the range of the dependent variable depends on
the parameters to be estimated, violating the regularity conditions
for MLE^. The frontier Is assumed to be deterministic, so the random
shocks affecting the firms are Influencing the measurement of effi
ciency. The advantages are that the estimates have statistical
properties and are not strongly influenced by outliers. Furthermore,
there are no limitations on the number of observations that can be
efficient. We can use several' functional forms to characterize the
technologies. Also mean measures of technical and allocative effi
ciency can be obtained.
2.4

Stochastic statistical frontier model

The above frontiers are deterministic. The essential idea behind
the stochastic frontier model is that the error term Is composed of
two parts: a symmetric component that permits random variation of the
frontier across firms, and captures the effect of measurement error,
other statistical noise, and random shocks outside the control of the
firm; and a one-sided component which captures the effect of ineffi
ciency relative to the stochastic frontier. This is represented by
y - f(x) - (u+w) where w is the symmetric component and u the
one-sided component, u > 0. Even though the frontier is stochastic,,
the concept of technical efficiency is consistent with Farrell's

^Greene (1980) has shown that the density of u must satisfy certain
conditions for MLE to be consistent and asymptotically efficient. But
further problems remain with his method since estimation of the model
where the distribution of the error term is assumed to be gamma
distributed are very difficult to implement (according to Greene).
When the distribution of the disturbance term is assumed to be
exponential or half-normal, Schmidt shows that the regulatory
conditions are violated; specifically the condition concerning the
range of the random variable being dependent on the parameters
estimated (1976, p. 239).

definition of technical inefficiency as an equiproportionate overuse
of all inputs. Allocative efficiency results in utilization of inputs
in the wrong proportions with respect to a particular output. The
residuals of the input demand functions derived from the first order
conditions of cost minimization are interpreted as a measure of
allocative inefficiency. Therefore, the various measures of efficien
cy presented earlier are still relevant in the context of a stocha
stic frontier production function even though the efficient isoquant
(frontier) is stochastic in the sense that its placement is allowed
to vary randomly across firms while a one-sided component captures
randomness under the control of the firm (Schmidt and Lovell, 1979,
pp. 344-345).
Schmidt and Lovell (1979) have estimated such a model for priva
tely-owned steam-electric generating plants operating In the U.S..
They obtained a measure of mean technical Inefficiency of 9.9% while
allocative inefficiency was estimated at 8.1% (pp. 359-360). Steven
son (1980) estimated a translog cost function using privately-owned
regulated electrical utilities. His results indicated a mean techni
cal inefficiency of 14.86%. No allocative inefficiency was reported
since he estimated a translog cost function without its cost shares
(p.65).
Another stochastic frontier model is the corrected ordinary least
squares approach (COLS). This model starts with tha stochastic
function specification presented earlier: y ■ f(x)- (iHv) where w is
assumed to have a symmetric distribution to capture the random
effects of measurement error and random shocks. Technical efficiency
relative to the stochastic frontier is captured by the one-sided
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error component -u, u

>0. The estimation procedure requires obtai

ning residuals from an OLS estimate of the production or cost
function.

These residuals provide consistent estimates of the

moments of the error distribution. This method requires an hypothesis
about the distribution of the error terms as in the MLE estimation.
Then, ve can correct the estimated constant term. Tills estimation
method^ provides consistent

estimates of all the parameters of

the model.
The main advantages of the COLS estimate are that it is easy to
use and provides consistent estimates of all the parameters of the
stochastic model. The disadvantages include the fact that it is less
efficient than MLE estimators and there is no guarantee that the
estimates of the variances of u and w obtained from the moments will
be non-negative. This would imply that some of the observations would
be above the estimated frontier. A more serious weakness has to do
with the fact that when using a model in which allocative efficiency
is not assumed to be zero,

the moments of the disturbance are

intractable® and we cannot obtain consistent estimates of all the
parameters. This limitation implies that the COLS method cannot be
used when we want estimates of allocative as well as technical
efficiency. Finally, this approach requires simple specifications
like a Cobb-Douglas function in order to determine technical ineffi
ciency from the distribution of the disturbance terms.
The main disadvantage of the stochastic frontier model with
maximum likelihood .estimation is that there is no good «a priori*

^Schmidt and Lovell (1979) refer to it as the OLS/moment method.
®Schraidt and Lovell (1979, p. 357).

argument to select among possible specific distributions of the error
terms. However, Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt have estimated a Cobb—
Douglas production function for the 1957-58 data on the U.S. primary
metals Industry across 28 states using exponential as well as
half-normal distribution of the disturbance terms. Their results
Indicate very close results for the estimated parameters of the
production function and the distribution of the disturbances (1977,
pp. 32-33). Furthermore,

the choice of a functional form for the

production function Is somewhat limited since the production function
i

must be homothetic.
The advantages of the latter approach include the fact that the
presence of the symmetric component in the residual term solves the
bounded-range problem encountered with some variants of the determi
nistic frontier model; therefore, the regularity conditions for MLE
are respected. Technical and allocative efficiency

can be obtained

by estimating a system of equations. The estimates of allocative
efficiency can be obtained on an observation by observation basis and
averaged in order to measure the mean allocative efficiency over the
sample. Moreover,

Jondrow et al.

(1982) have shown that we can

decompose the residual components of the production function in its
two portions. They derive the conditional density function which
allows an estimation of technical inefficiency on an observation by
observation basis.

Furthermore,

the introduction of a stochas

tic component in the model is certainly a step closer to reality. In
a world of uncertainty, managers cannot be expected to control every
aspect of the firm's environment (internal and asternal). Also,
having to consider random shocks, statistical noise and measurement
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errors as part of inefficiency was a weakness of the deterministic
models that has been overcome with the stochastic frontier models.
Compared to deterministic parametric frontier models* stochastic
frontier models are not as sensitive to extreme outliers* and no
limitation is Imposed on the number of observations that can be
efficient. Compared to the COLS models, more functional forms for the
production function can be used to represent the underlying technolo
gy72.5

Non-frontier efficiency models

Lau and Yotopoulos (1971,

1973) developed a model to measure

technical and allocative efficiencies. A sample of n firms is parti
tioned into two types (small vs large, public vs private, etc.). The
prediction function is written:
Yj

-

Aj

where the terms

f(xj[)

Aj

> 0

*

1*1,...,n

index technical efficiency with the two types

of firms being equally technically efficient if* and only if* A} *
A2. The first order conditions for profit maximization are written
d Ajf(x^)/d x* ■ lij(w£j/pj). The terms ljj > 0 index allocative
efficiency and represent the ability of a type of firm to equate the
value of an input's marginal product with its normalized prices. The
two types of firms are equally price efficient if* and only if Ijjl2j, and if they are absolutely price efficient* then ljj*l. Finally*
the two types of firms are equally economically efficient if* and
only if* their respective profit functions coincide* From a specified
functionnal form* and the derived first order conditions for profit
?Kopp and Smith estimated a stochastic frontier model using a CES* CD
and translog production function (1980).
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maxlmization( we can test the following hypotheses: equal technical
efficiency! equal price efficiency! equal economic efficiency! and
absolute price efficiency for each group of firm (for example!
publicly owned vs privately owned firms).
The disadvantage of this model is that it cannot be extended to
investigate efficiency on a firm-by-firm basis. Also* the functlonnal
form chosen for the production function must be sufficiently tracta
ble to permit derivation of the associated profit function. Further
more, no absolute measure of technical efficiency can be computed
since no efficiency frontier is estimated. Yotopoulos and Lau (1973)
estimated their model using data from the small and large Indian
farms between 1955 and 1957. Their results indicate that small farms
are more economically efficient. The relative economic efficiency of
small farms is not due to superior price efficiency (both are found
to be price efficient)*

but they have established the superior

technical efficiency of the small farms (p. 22k')
A second model, developed by Toda (1976), can ba used to Investi
gate allocative efficiency. He assumes that the firm is technically
efficient, and its cost function is a generalized Leontlef function
as follows:
c “ A11 Pi + 2 a 12 Pl1^2 P2^ 2 + a22 P2
where
C - unit cost minimum at the given output level
PI - price of capital as the shadow pries
P2 - wage rate as the shadow price

Ai2: o
Since the partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to
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the factor prices must equal the quantity of that factor,
k/y “ A n + Aj2 (Pl/pz)-1^2
l/y ■ A 22 + A 12 Cpi/pz)1^2
where
k/y - capital-output ratio
l/y - labor-output ratio
Toda Introduces an hypothesis that the observed price ratio differs
from the shadow price ratio by a fixed-proportIon a,
Pl/P2 “ a wi/w2
where
wi - observed price of capital
W2 - observed wage rate
a > 0
Under this hypothesis the demand functions, k/y and l/y( are expres
sed with the observed prices as independent variables
k/y ■ A n + Aj2 (a wi/w2)“* ^
l/y ■ A22 + A12 Ca wi/w2) ^ ^
Substituting the observed demand functions in the cost function
C * A n wi + (a“ l/2 +

^2

w 2 * ^ + A 22 *2

which is different from the minimum cost function
C*« A n W! + 2 A n wj^/2 ^ 1 / 2 + ^22 W2

When the coefficient a ■ 1, C* - C. At this point the observed price
ratio coincides with the shadow price ratio. Toda suggests estimating
a system of equations. After concerting the system of equations
(demand functions) into an equivalent system shown as:
y “ A n (a1/2 _ a"l/2)
where

+ ^12 a“*/2 w + ^ n ci + A 22 *2
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y - (k/y, l/y)'
v - ((W 1 /W2 )1/2)'

d ” (0, (wj, W2)l/^)'; the dummy price variable,
cj" (1, 0)'; the intercept,
C2“ (0, 1)'; the intercept,
If the observed prices equal the shadow prices (a - 1), the coeffi
cient of the d variable will vanish so that the symmetry restriction
across equations will be imposed on the coefficients of the price
variables.

Toda estimates the last system of equations with and

without the d variable. The significance of the price disparity
is tested by the extent to which the sum of squares of residuals
diminishes by adding the d variable (pp. 259-262).
This model has been estimated by Toda (1976)

for the Soviet

manufacturing industries. His results indicate that for five indus
tries one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the factor price
ratio equals the marginal productivity ratio. Significant results are
obtained only for three industries (p. 263).
The advantage of this method is that it can be used with more
flexible forms. The disadvantages are that the measures of allocative
inefficiency are not firm specific, and the parameter

a

measures

only the systematic portion of allocative inefficiency (Forsund et
al., 1980, p. 19)®.
2.6 Total factor productivity (TFP)
Caves and Christensen (1980) have used the total factor produc
tivity approach to compare relative efficiencies. They claim that TFP

®According to Forsund et al. (1980, p. 19), technical inefficiency
might be introduced in this model by adding one-sided disturbances to
the input demand function and the cost function.
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is the single best measure of productive efficiency (1980,

pp.960).

TFP is defined as the real output per unit of real resources used.
The computation of TFP requires the estimation of the following
equation:
ln(TFPk/TFP1) -Z

<Rik + Rn)/2 * In (Y^/Yn)-

E ni <csik + CS±1)/2 * In (Xlk/Xik)
where
. k,

1 are adjacent time periods in the

case of

cross-sectional comparisons
. Y's are output indexes
. R's

"

. CS's "
. X's

"

"

revenu shares

input cost shares
"

indexes

. 1 denote the Individual output, input
According to Caves and Christensen, this equation is the exact index
procedure which corresponds to a homogeneous translog production
function (p. 963). The estimation of such model for the Canadian
railroad industry indicated that between 1956 and 1965 tha federally
owned Canadian National railroad productivity Increased between 80%
and 90% as rapidly as that of the privately owned Canadian Pacific
railroad®. From 1964 to 1968 the relative productivity Increases were
reversed (p. 967).
The advantage of this model is that it allows

tha use of a more

involved functionnal form (translog). The main disadvantage is the
fact that TFP does not discriminate between types of inefficiencies.
It does not provide an estimate of efficiency with respect to a

®The CN is owned by the Federal government while the CP is privately owned.
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frontier.

In the measurement

of TFP are incorporated returns to

scale, price effect, regulationeffect,

inefficiencies, ect., with no

way to separate them. Finally,

it does not account for the random

variations outside the control

of the

firm, measurement error, or

other statistical noise that may affect the estimates. Finally, the
measurement of increases in comparative efficiency will be affected
by the starting point; if a firm is poorly managed and recoups some
of its inefficiency over the years, it would perform well compared to
an initially more efficient firm.
2.7

Dummy variable model

Comparative efficiencies across various types of organizations
have also been studied using average production^, cost and profit
functions estimated by OLS techniques.

In order to account for

organizationnal differences a dummy variable is Included in the model
to be estimated. Dllorenzo and Robinson (1982), Meyer (1975) and
Pescatrice and Trapani (1980) used such a methodology. For example,
Pescatrice and Trapani estimate a translog cost function assuming
that

the firm minimizes its cost of production. The model to be

estimated is a system of equations composed of the cost function and
its cost shares. After pooling the data for public and private firms,
a binary variable reflecting the mode of ownership is introduced in
the model. Efficiency is not estimated directly, but the comparison
between organizations provides some measure of relative efficiency.
^Forsund et al. (1980, p20) state that the term frontier is asso
ciated with maximal possible output while the average function is
associated with mean output. The notion of an average function would
perhaps be more meaningful in a random coefficients model. An average
function can then be defined as the function obtained when the random
coefficients obtain their expected values .
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(Estimates of relative efficiency obtained from the binary variable
model will be presented in the next section).
The main advantage of this approach is its simplicity since it
only requires estimation of a simple function using OLS. The dis
advantages are numerous.

First,

the estimation of a production

technology using a cost function and duality theory requires the firm
to be efficient in the first place. This implies that the firm must
be producing on its frontier and be allocatively efficient. Further
more, the binary variable measures a combination of random shocks,
technical and allocative efficiencies. Finally, it uses the concept
of mean output which does not allow an estimate of an efficient
frontier, and therefore, no absolute measure of efficiency can be
computed.
3- Review of the literature on estimates of relative efficiencies of
private and public electric utilities**.
Many empirical studies have been done with the electric utili
ties,

covering a vide range of topics including measurement of

economies of scale, elasticities of substitution and technical
change*^.

Few of them address the issue of efficiency comparisons

across various types of organizationnal structure.

The following

section reviews these contributions with respect to their metho
dology, results, and validity.
Meyer (1975) is concerned about the influence of ownership on the
adoption of new innovations and other costs of providing services. To

**As far as we can tell, there is no study dealing with consumer
cooperative electrical utilities and the concept of efficiency
comparison.
*2see Cowing and Smith (1978) for a survey of that literature.
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test his hypotheses he makes use of the duality relationship between
technology sets and cost functions. He used a dummy variable approach
which pooled both private and public firms; and used a Chow test for
the equality of all the coefficients estimated for the private and
public firms. The model estimated is as follows:
Cost - f (dummy, gen, gen2, gen^)
where
Cost - total cost of production,
dummy - dummy variable to account for ownership form,
gen - net generation in 1000's kwh as a measure of output.
Meyer found significant differences in the cost function between
private and public utilities in each year (1967, 1968, 1969), with
public firms having lower costs (no magnitude of the difference was
given). The Chow test indicated that the coefficients of the cost
functions were not the same (p. 393).
Even though Meyer concluded that ownership seemed to matter, he
recognized that sources of the cost difference were not identified.
No attempt was made to control for such important factors as prices
of inputs, technology, regulatory influences and the objective
functions of each ownership structure.*3
Sowell (1978) assessed the relative efficiency of private and
public enterprises. He hypothezised that neither private nor public
firms are likely to satisfy the prerequisites for efficient alloca
tion; based on non transferability of ownership, an active zero
^However, Meyer recognizes that comparison of cost alone cannot
determine whether firms are using the least cost technology availa
ble. He noted that technological possibilities, prices of inputs as
well as objective function have to be accounted for (p. 392).
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profit constraint* and low opportunity costs associated with non pe
cuniary income, he predicted that the effects on resource mlsallocation should be more pronounced for publicly owned firm. Recognizing
that production may be characterized by: (1) increasing returns to
scale,

(2) limited ex-post substitution,

(3) non-neutral technical

change, Sowell retained a generalized Leontief production function.
Regulatory constraint and price subsidization were specified in his
models estimated for private and public plants respectively. Input
demand functions were derived and estimated. His model tested for
fixed input coefficients, duality between cost and production which
implies consistency with cost minimization, substitutability between
inputs, cost differences between ownership forms, and a test for the
possibility of difference between market and reported prices using
Toda's methodology. If duality between cost and production holds
exactly for each form of ownership, Sowell states that cost differen
ces arising from different technologies may be ruled out; when both
forms show cost minimizing behavior, cost differences can be Imputed
to input prices and relative efficiency of ownership structures (p
.41). But if both are cost minimizing, cost differences can be
imputed to different technologies and/or different prices. Furthermo
re,

if duality holds,

the plants will exhibit cost minimizing

behavior, allocative inefficiency accounted by differences between
market prices and reported prices is ruled out. His models were
estimated on annual observations of steam electric generating plants
placed in operations in the Southern United States between 1950 and
1970. The data on costs for the plants covered five years from 1968
to 1972. The sample included 30 private and 14 publicly owned plants.

Sowells' results Indicated that the regulatory constraint for the
private firm was not binding. Furthermoret the underlying duality
between cost and production functions were satisfied, Implying that
cost minimizing input combinations were estimated.

However,

his

results indicated allocative inefficiency in private firms with
respect to capital and fuel. Those results are in contradiction with
the implication of cost- minimization which requires the firm to be
both technically and allocatively efficient (Forsund et al., 1980, p.
7). Using the sample means for the price variables and the level of
output, the average cost and the marginal cost were .02$/kwh and
.0175$/kwh, respectively. The constrained estimates were not fully
consistent with cost minimization for publicly owned firms. The
subsidization of input prices did not significantly influence the
firm. Again using the sample means for input prices and the level of
output, the estimated average cost and marginal cost were .055$/kwh
and .069$/kwh, respectively. Based on the comparisons of average and
marginal costs, Sowell concluded that the private firms were more
efficient than the publicly owned firms. His input demand equa
tions suggested that both ownership forms shoved allocative ineffi
ciency.
Sowells' results are contradictory since he claims that duality
between cost and production exists even though allocative inefficien
cy is reported. Furthermore, even if duality was confirmed, cost
difference could still be attributed to technology differences as
well as price differences. Sowell assumed that technology of public
and private firms were similar since they respect the duality
condition, and he drew his conclusion on the basis of AC and MC
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comparison after controlling for price differences.
Pescatrice and Trapani (1980) sought to determine whether there
is a significant cost difference arising from alternative forms of
ownership. Their methodology required the derivation of objective
functions for both public and private firms. The regulated private
firm is perceived as minimizing its internal cost of producing a
given level of output, while the objective of the public firm is
revenue or output maximization under zero profit constraint. Using a
translog production function and cost minimization, they estimate a
cost function and the cost share equations for a sample of 33 private
and

23 public

firms. A dummy variable accounts for the type of

ownership. Output, factor prices and technology^ are controlled. A
pooled sample is estimated assuming the regulatory effect on private
firms is zero. Their results suggest that public firms have 24-332
lower per unit costs than private firms. They attribute these
differences to the behavioral objectives of public and private firms,
whereby public firms seek to minimize true cost while private do not
because of the effective rate of regulation of private firms^ (p.
275).
Dilorenzo and Robinson

(1982) hypothesize that public firms

operating in a competitive environment act in ways similar to their
private counterparts. Political competition is thought to impose the
same cost-minimizing pressures on public managers as does economic
competition on managers of private firms. They predict no difference

^Pescatrice and Trapani consider only electric utilities using
fossil-fuel (coal, gas, oil) steam-electric operations to generate
electricity. Furthermore, vintages are also accounted for.
l^The Averch-Johnson effect could not be confirmed (p. 271).
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in production efficiency between ownership structure. Their estima
tion is based on the following short run cost function:
TC ■ ao + aj Gen^ + a2 Fuelj+ 33 Capi+ ej
where
TC = total annual steam production expenses,
Gen.

**

steam generation

in kwh,

Fuel =

weighted average

fuel cost per billionsof kwh,

Cap

total generating

capacity of steam plant,

9

Dilorenzo and Robinson controlled for technology by using firms fqr
which steam electricity generation accounted for a great majority of
total net generation. They retained those firms with average net
generation for the sample period between .5 and 4 billions kwh.
Finally,

only those utilities which provided service to every

customer type were included*®. To test for efficiency differences,
they pooled the sample of public and private firms, and a dummy
variable was

included in the above cost function. The results

indicated that privately owned electric utilities were significantly
less cost efficient than public electric utilities (p. 120). They did
not report the magnitude of the difference. Dilorenzo and Robinson
did not explain their results other than by saying that rate regula
tion leads to overutilization of capital while public firms could
be enhanced toward more efficiency when they are operating in a
competitive envlronnement (p. 112).
4- Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed several models that could be used to
*®Their data set included 18 public firms and 23 private firms for 122
observations over the years 1970-1972.
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test for efficiency.

The selection of the proper model has to

consider what each of those is capable of doing with regard to the
objective that is pursued. The stochastic frontier model offers
several advantages over other models.
If ve compare stochastic frontier models to deterministic parame
tric and non-parametrlc models, the former have the advantages of
allowing an unlimited number of observations to be technically
efficient^?,

and it is not sensitive to outliers. Random shocks,

statistical noise, and measurement errors are not confused with
measurement of technical efficiency.

The stochastic models permit

measurement of technical and allocative efficiencies separately and
these estimates have testable,

statistical properties. Finally,

deterministic parametric frontiers represent the concept of best
practice technology while stochastic frontier models represent the
most efficient technology. The best practice technology is likely to
overestimate technical inefficiency. They can estimate technical
efficiency observation by observation.
When comparing the stochastic frontier models to the determin
istic statistical models, the stochastic frontier models shows some
advantages while deterministic statistical model shows a bounded
range problem when using such distributions as exponential and
half-normal disturbance terms. (Greene has shown that it was possible
to solve that problem by using a Gamma density function, but the
model becomes very difficult to estimate). The deterministic statlsl?The stochastic frontier model and the deterministic statistical
model allow each firm to be efficient with respect to its own
frontier while the deterministic parametric model is based on the
concept of best practice technology one can observe.

tlcal model considers random shocks, measurement error and statisti
cal noise as part of technical efficiency while the stochastic
frontier model separates those from technical efficiency. Both models
have no «a priori* good arguments to select a distribution for the
disturbance term. Furthermore, both models can estimate technical
efficiency observation by observation when technical and allocative
efficiency are estimated simultaneously. Finally, they are both
limited in the choice of functional form: the production function
must be homothetic.
The advantages of stochastic frontier model over non-frontier
models are due to the fact that inefficiency parameters estimated
from non-frontier models are not firm specific, even for allocative
efficiency measurement, and measure only the systematic portion of
allocative inefficiency (Forsund et al., 1980, p. 19). It is argued
by Forsund et al. that technical inefficiency can be introduced by
adding one-sided disturbances to the system of input demand equa
tions, but this procedure makes the model stochastic.
Finally,

when compared

to the dummy variable model,

tha

stochastic frontier model shows several advantages as well. First,
the concept of an average function, which is used in the dummy
variable model, does not represent the most efficient technology. Tha
dummy variable measures a combination of random shocks, technical,
and allocative efficiency (when the cost function is estimated) and
is not capable of discriminating between them. No absolute measure of
efficiency (technical and allocative) can be obtained from such a
model. Furthermore, the estimation of a dummy variable model requires
that we pool date for different ownership structures together in
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order to estimate the coefficient of the binary dummy variable. This
procedure can cause biases when technologies are different! which may
be the case for public and private utilities.
Several papers dealing with the comparison of efficiencies by
ownership types have been reviewed. All the papers reviewed show
methodological limitations. Three of those used the dummy variable
approach and estimated that public utilities were more efficient than
private utilities. Pescatrice and Trapani estimated the cost diffe
rence between private and public to be 24-33% per unit of output in
favor of public utilities. All three papers estimated cost functions,
used pooled public and private utilities, and assumed that technolo
gies were the same (no dummy variables were introduced to account for
possible different coefficients in the cost functions). From those
studies we have an indication that public utilities are more effi
cient. We do not know if one or both ownership structures are
efficient, and we have no indication as to which type of ineffi
ciency is more Important.
Sowell's procedure is more appropriate since he used an approach
developed by Toda in estimating a generalized Leontlef average cost
function and its input demand equations. He estimated different
models for each ownership structures and controlled for regulation as
well as capital subsidization for public firms. He used aversge
output and input prices to calculate AC and MC for each ownership
structure. Private utilities showed lower AC and MC than public
utilities. Furthermore! his estimates allowed him to conclude that
both private and public utilities were allocatlvely inefficient.
Sowell did not provide any separate estimates of technical and
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allocative efficiency. However, his results are contradictory since
he claims that private and public plants respect duality conditions,
and at the same time they show allocative inefficiency. His conclu
sion on ownership efficiency is based on a comparison of AC and MC.
but technology of public and private plants are not controlled for.
The review of these tests of efficiency and ownership structure
shows that much remains to be done. The next chapter presents an
appropriate methodology and the models to be estimated in order to
answer some of the questions regarding the technical and allocative
efficiencies of various ownership structures.

FOURTH CHAPTER
TECHNOLOGY AND MODELS TO BE ESTIMATED
1- Introduction
To characterize technology, the main features of interest are:
substitution among factors, returns to scale and homotheticity, and
the nature of technical change. Several functional forms are availa
ble to capture the characteristics of the technology;

the most

frequently used are : (1) Cobb-Douglas, (2) CES, and (3) Translog.
Other functional forms can be found in the literature: (1) ZellnerRevankar,

(2) Nerlove-Ringstad,

(3) Fixed coefficient, and (A)

Generalized Leontief. Only the first three models will be discussed
with respect to their ability to capture the features of technology
of electricity generation. Those three are better known and most
\
widely used.
Section two discusses the basic characteristics of the technology
underlying electricity generation.

Section three discusses the

various restrictions that functional forms (C-D, CES, translog) place
on the underlying technology. The fourth section discusses the choice
of the proper functional form with respect to the objectives of the
research, the possible distortions due to their built-in restric
tions, and the ability to capture technololgy. Finally, in the fifth
section, the theoretical model to test for efficiency differences Is
presented. This section includes the functional form of the produc
tion function, the justification of the objective function for eech
type of firms, a derivation of the system of equations that will be
estimated, and the relevant likelihood function.
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2- Technology of electricity generation
2.1 Basic characteristics
Technology of electricity generation can be characterized at
three different levels: boiler-turblne-generator
and firm.

(BTG), plant,

It can be characterized differently for estimation at

each of those levels of aggregation.

Kopp and Smith

(1978, p.

1050) argue that returns to scale measured at the firm level will
depend not only on the returns to scale of the plants but also on
their respective rates of utilization.

The characteristics of

technology will be influenced by the aggregation process. Fischer,
et al.

(1969) also argue that differences in the type of plants

and their pattern of use across firms can seriously affect the
relationship between characteristics attributed to the technology
from aggregate firm estimates.
A second basic characteristic to consider when estimating
technology is to distinguish base load from peak load plants.
Electric utilities have to supply all demands for electricity. Since
demand fluctuates over time, some plants are used only to satisfy
peak demand. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to mix plants
aimed at different uses, even if they embody the same technologies.
According to Kopp and Smith

(1980), either some adjustment for

capacity utilization or selective sampling of plants will be necessa
ry to assure comparability in the association between the flows of
inputs and output produced for all plants in the sample. Since it is
difficult to develop accurate measures of input usage and to correct
for peak versus base load use, selective sampling technique is more
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appropriate. It Is argued that plants of recent vintages are likely
to be base load plants^.
The third basic characteristic refers to whether one seeks to
estimate ex-ante or ex-post technology. Ex-ante refers to technology
at the blueprint stage. The entrepreneur selects a configuration of
generating equipment from these blueprints, perhaps on the basis of
input prices. Ex-post refers to the technology associated with a
specific blueprint that has been put In place in the plant. Features
of the technology, and certainly efficiencies may appear different if
we are using ex-ante or ex-post data to estimate the production
function. Once a plant's design characteristics are fixed in terms of
a specific configuration of capital equipment, technology is ex-post
and the scope for substitution will be substantially reduced. In this
research, models with assumed ex ante and ex post technologies are
estimated separately.2
2.2

Factor substitution

The use of ex-ante rather than ex-post technology models as
well as the use of plant rather than firm will affect the estimates
of factor substitution elasticity among inputs. Ex-post technology
should show less substitutability among Inputs than estimates

lit makes sense to assume that new plants will be of base load
characteristics since technical change is mostly embodied in electri
city generation. Firms will have Incentives to use new plants (and
most efficient) if they behave as cost minlmizers. Older plants (lass
efficient ones) would be kept for peak load purposes. Of course, the
least cost operation requires the use of appropriate plants. This
plant mix problem is not considered in this research.
^A8 will be described in chapter 5, our data set comprises information
with respect to the first 5 years of operation of each plant.
Therefore, it is likely that we will not have a clear ex ante or ex
post technology, but a mixture of both.
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using ex-ante technologies. For example, Cowing and Smith's survey
article (1978,p.180) shows that elasticities of substitution estima
ted using ex-post technology models are less than those for ex-ante
models, though still significantly different from zero in both
cases.^ The estimation of various pair elasticities ranges from .1 to
.75.
2.3 Technological change
Technical change characterizes the process by which a technology
changes over time. Generally it involves a description of the
mechanism by which these changes are introduced into the production
activities and an indication of their effect on optimal factor input
use.
Embodied technical change has been shown to be appropriate for
the technology of electricity generation (Cowing and Smith, 1978, p.
179). It specifies that new capital equipment reflects the changes
which occur in technology. In this case, different technologies are
distinguished according to the time periods, or vintages, In which
the capital equipment was built. Technological changes have also been
shown to be labor and fuel saving, that is to say non-neutral (Cowing
and Smith, 1979, p. 179).
2.A Scale effects
The scale effects refer to whether technology is homogenous
or homothetic. Most empirical studies have assumed electricity
generation technology to be homothetic (MRTS is constant along a
factor ray) (Cowing and Smith, 1978, p. 178). However, Christensen
^All the studies reviewed by Cowing and Smith except two (Nerlove,
Christensen and Greene) are using data evaluated at the plant
level.

V
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and Greene (1976, p. 665), estimate input share equations derived
from a translog cost function, arguing that technology is non-ho
mo thetic.
Technology also has to be characterized with respect to returns
to scale. According to Cowing and Smith (1978, p. 178) there appears
to be significant scale economies in steani generation between small
and intermediate-size BTG units.
3- Functional forms^
3.1 Cobb-Douglas
The Cobb-Douglas production function is represented as follows :
(3.1)

Y » A Ka Lb Fc

The Cobb-Douglas representation Imposes the following restrictions
on the production technology :
(a) homogeneity of degree r-a+b+c; and homothetlcity
(b) elasticity of substitution - 1; implying that
factor shares are independent of their prices.
(c) weak separability between Inputs (the MRTS
between any input pair is independent from the
t

level of any other input)
Weak separability has the unrealistic implication that changes In
relative prices of variable Inputs will induce changes in the demand
for those Inputs which are Independent of the level of fixed Inputs.
In addition, technological changes can be expressed in terms of
variations in the parameters of the production function over time.
Variation in the Intercept parameter A represents neutral techno
logical change. A change in the Intercept parameter represents a

^This section draws from Brown (1966) , and from Intriligator (1978).
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disembodied technological change and can be depicted as a shift of
the entire production function. It does not affect the MRTS between
inputs. A non-neutral technological change is depicted by a variation
in the ratio of the two elasticities of production; for example, a
change in b relative to a or c. This alters the MRTS between inputs.
Factor saving or factor using technical changes are indicated by the
direction of change of these ratios.
3.2 Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
The CES production function was developed in response to the
restrictive characteristics of the. Cobb-Douglas production function.
It does not impose unitary elasticity of substitution among inputs,
although it requires that elasticity be constant and independent of
the level of factors of production used. It is represented as
follows:
(3.2)

Y - A

a K-t + b L“fc + c F-t -r/c

where A is a neutral parameter, t is a substitution parameter,
a, b, c are share parameters, and r represents the degree of homoge
neity of the function (i.e. the degree of returns to scale^). Its
characteristics are:
(a) homogeneity - r; the CES i6 homogeneous of degree r
in the input levels.
(b) elasticity of substitution, 8 “ l/(l+t)
(c) strong separability
In the multi-input case s is identical for all input pairs.

^The CES production function was derived independently by two groups,
Arrow et al. (1961) and Brown et al. (1963). The second derivation is
more general since it permits any degree of returns to scale as
opposed to the first presentation where constant returns to scale is
assumed.
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Thus, although the CES function allows for elasticities of substitu
tion different from one or zero, It does present the Inconvenience of
imposing equal substitution possibilities among all input pairs.
Disembodied technological change can be captured through para
meter A and is classified as neutral technical change. Another
parameter change which does not affect the MRTS between Inputs is r,
the parameter that captures the degree of returns to scale. Non
neutral technical change will be associated with share parameters a,
b, c as well as with s, the elasticity of substitution.
3.3 Transcendental logarithmic (Translog)
The functional forms above imposed severe restrictions on the
nature of production technology. In particular, restrictions regar
ding the elasticities of substitution and weak separability may be
unrealistic and may induce serious specification errors in empirical
analyses.
The development of more flexible forms provide appropriate func
tions to measure characteristics of technology.

Flexible forms

provide second order approximations to arbitrary functional forms. A
functional form is flexible if the parameters of such a function may
be chosen such that the value of the function and its first and
second derivatives coincide with the value and first and second
derivatives of any arbitrary function. Since the elasticities of
substitution and separability conditions depend upon these values, a
flexible form can accurately represent the elasticities of substitu
tion and will be free of any separability restrictions. The translog
is the most popular of these flexible forms. It reduces to multi-in
put Cobb-Douglas and a CES as special cases. It can be written as :
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(3.3) In Y ■ In 8q + aalnA +E

ajlnxj+ 1/2 baa(lnA)2+

1/2E ni^nj b^jlnx£lnxj+ Enj_ b^lnx^lnA
where Y - output
x±- inputs

A - technology index
This

function is in general non-homothetic but it Includes

homogeneity of degree one as a special case. When we assume homotheticity,

the restrictions

imposed

on

the translog correspondto

homogeneity of degree one. Furthermore, the assumption of Hicksneutral technical change is usually made. Therefore, with homotheticity and Hicks neutrality, the translog production function is:
(3.4) In Y - InA + lnao+E jailnx-i+ 1/2E iEjbijlnx^lnxj
The factor shares are represented asfollows :
(3.5) Si ■ ai+ b u l n xj+ bj^ln X2 + bjjln X3
The factor shares are dependent on the input levels. Therefore,'
this function is non-homothetic and non-separable unless restric
tions are Imposed on the parameters.
The Allen partial elasticities

ofsubstitution

for the three

input case are:

where G is the determinant of the input share equations and Gjj is
the cofactor Gjj in G. The estimated AES can be computed for each
observation and input pair.
Finally, the translog is well suited to test if technical change
is disembodied and/or embodied.
4- Selection of proper functional form
The selection of a functional form requires that we consider
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the

following elements:

(1) objectives of the research (not all

estimated functional forms provide the same information), (2)
critical distortions in the estimated results caused by built-in
restrictions in functional forms, and (3) the capacity of capturing
critical characteristics of the technology.
In this research we are not directly Interested in estimating
the various characteristics of technology of electricity genera
tion. The critical point is that the functional form does not
distort estimates of inefficiency. Since the information required
to test for efficiency differences across ownership structures
will be provided by the disturbance terms appended to each model,
all the above functional forms will provide the necessary infor
mation.
Each model presented in section 3 has advantages and disad
vantages. The translog production function offers the most flexibili
ty in capturing the characteristics of technology. However, the use
of stochastic frontier model requires homothetic production functions
in order to discriminate between the types of inefficiencies (Greene.
1980, p. 103). For the translog, this means Imposing homogeneity of
degree one. However, the estimation of a translog production function
model along with its factor shares, is a considerably more difficult
task than estimating other functional forms. It takes up a lot of
degrees of freedom and requires imposing restrictions across equa
tions. CES functional form allows varying rates of factor substitu
tion, though substitution will be equal for each pair of inputs. It
also allows varying returns to scale. However the CES production
function is difficult to estimate since it cannot be linearized with
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respect to Its parameters. It has been shown to be difficult to fit
to most data sets (Brown. 1966. p. 61). For the Cobb-Douglas form,
factor substitution elasticities are constrained to be equal to one,
while returns to scale are unconstrained. Technical change can be
incorporated as embodied or disembodied change. Of all the functional
forms Cobb-Douglas is the simplest to estimate.
The distortion of efficiency measurements caused by various
production function models has been analyzed by Kopp and Smith
(1980, p. 1057). They compare functional forms (C-D, CES, translog)
with various

frontier estimators.

Their results^ are shown in

table 1:
Table 1
Estimates of technical efficiency
and characteristics of technology
using various functional forms
type of functional forms
vintage?

C-D

CES

Translog

Technical
inefficiency

1
2

.828
.950

.828
.952

.846
.954

Returns to
scale

1
2

1.003
1.054

1.002
1.005

IB
1.244

Elasticities of
substitution

1
2

1.0
.95
1.0
.867
IB means ill-behaved

IB
.705

The measurements of technical inefficiency estimated from each
^ O n l y the results with respect to stochastic frontier estimators
are presented.

^Vintage refers to different technologies that are distinguished
according to different time periods in which the capital equipment
was built. Kopp and Smith pooled all steam electrical plants built
between 1961 and 1965 in the first vintage, while plants built
between 1966 and 1969 were grouped in the second vintage.

functional form are very similar**. These results are important
since they seem to indicate that the selection of a functional
form will not affect the measure of technical inefficiency. The
Cobb-Douglas would impose a given shape upon the isoquant, since
factor substitution is equal to one. From what we know about the
technology, elasticity of substitution is less than one. To assume
that s * 1 would flatten the frontier isoquant and impose an unrea
listic assumption on the model. Therefore, it would likely result
in a larger error term representing allocative inefficiency. If
we assume .that all organizational forms have similar elasticities
of substitution among input pairs,

the bias introduced by the

unrealistic assumption of substitution elasticities equal to one
would not likely differ across ownership types**.
From the previous section we know that empirical studies show
electricity generation technology to exhibit mildly increasing
returns to scale, substitution among factors less than one for
ex-ante

technology;

and, finally, embodied technological change,

which is best captured by vintages and capital-using models.
Even though Cobb-Douglas is a more restricted form than the
**Kopp and Smith did not obtain estimates of allocative inefficien
cy since they used only a production function.
^However, Sowell (1978, p. 89) states that: the general pattern of
Allen elasticities of substitution are not similar for public and
private plants. Private plants exhibit strong capital-labor and
fuel-labor substitution and virtually zero fuel-capital substitu
tion. Public plants display strong labor-fuel substitution and
limited fuel-capital substitution. Labor and capital are comple
ments in publicly owned production .

others^,

it is an appropriate model considering the objectives

of the research and the limited distortions it places on technical
inefficiency measurements.

The Cobb-Douglas production function

will be selected because: (1) it provides us with all the required
information to compare technical and allocative efficiencies among
various organizational forms, (2) it does not Introduce biases in the
measurement of technical inefficiency,

(3) it captures several

Important characteristics of technology underlying electricity
generation, (4) it is easier to estimate than any other functional
form,

(5) it has been used with stochastic frontier estimation,

providing us with a benchmark to compare our results; and (6) it is
not evident that placing unrealistic restrictions on substitution
elasticities will affect the relative measures of allocative ineffi
ciency across ownership types.
5- Model to be estimated
5.1 Introduction
The complete model requires that we select a proper objective
function to characterize the behavior of the firms. This is an
important task since measurement of inefficiency depends on a
standard of comparison which is derived from our behavioral hypothe
ses with regard to each type of ownership structure. We also have to
derive the system of equations from the selected production function
and the objective function. We have established that a stochastic
frontier model best meets the objectives of this research. However,

lOtfe have to remember that frontier estimator requires homothetlclty, and because of that restriction translog is assumed to be
CRTS. Furthermore, a translog functional form is more difficult
to estimate because of restrictions across equations.
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the use of such a model requires some hypotheses about the error
structure. Such hypotheses will be discussed and a derivation of the
relevant likelihood function will be presented. A discussion of the
estimation procedure will complete this section.
5.2 Objective function for each type of ownership
In electric utilities, the literature strongly suggests

that

output is exogenous to the firm. Nerlove was one of the first to
assume that electric utilities would, therefore, behave as cost
minimizers. He argued that**:
1. Power cannot be

stored in large quantities and must be.

supplied on demand.
2. Revenues from the sale of power by private companies depend
primarily on rates set by utility

commissions and other

regulatory bodies.
3. Much of the fuel used in power production is purchased under
long-term contracts at set prices.

The level of prices is

determined in competition with other uses.
4. The industry is heavily unionized, and wage rates are also set
by contracts that extend over a long period of time. Over long
periods, wages appear to be determined competitively.
5. The capital market in which utilities seek funds for expansion
is highly competitive and the rates at which individual utili
ties can borrow are little affected by individual actions over
a wide range.
From
it

these characteristics Nerlove draws two conclusions. First,

is possible toregard output of a firm and the prices it pays for

^Nerlove- (1963, p. 168)
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inputs as exogenous. Second, the problem of the individual firm in
the industry would appear to be that of minimizing the total costs of
production of a given output, subject to a production function and
the prices it must pay for factors of production. Most economists
have followed Nerlove'8 cost minimization assumption on the grounds
that output is exogenous to the plant. The arguments presented to
justify cost minimization for private utilities can apply to public
as well as cooperative utilities. Power cannot be stored for them any
more than for private plants. Prices of fuel and labor will certainly
be determined with long term contracts as for the private plants,
and will be determined competitively over long periods. The price
of capital for public and cooperative firms is not a market price.
Both are receiving subsidies from the government. However, the price
of capital is still exogenous to the firm since it is determined by
governmental policy. Only the rate of return condition is not met.
This is Irrelevant in this context since output is exogenous to the
plants. Even if public and cooperative firms aimed at maximizing
profit, the optimum solution would be equivalent to that of cost
minimization when output is
5.3

e x o g e n o u s *2.

Derivation of models to be estimated

Several models can be derived and estimated to obtain the
Information required to test our hypothesis with respect to efficien
cies of ownership structure. One could directly estimate a production
or a

cost function. The former is inappropriate since the estimates

12Pescatrice and Trapani hypothesize that public utilities will
have an objective of revenue or output maximization rather than
profit maximization. Furthermore they present some evidence that
public utilities behave as cost mlnimizers (1980, p.271).
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would be inconsistent. This is because output is exogenous and inputs
are related to one another through cost minimization. Such a model
would show severe multicolinearity and has to be rejected. The
estimation of the cost function can be appropriate under certain
circumstances.

Since the right-handside variables of the cost

function are exogenous, it can be estimated without worrying about
complications due to simultaneity. However, the cost function model
does not provide all the Information needed to distinguish technical
and allocative inefficiencies.

The moments of the disturbance

characterizing the stochastic cost function (to be described later)
are intractable, and we cannot manipulate them to obtain consistent
estimates of the parameters of the distribution of the disturbance.
It means that we cannot distinguish between technical and allocative
inefficiencies on the basis of a cost function alone^3. However, if
we make the hypothesis that plants are allocatively efficient, a
cost function is sufficient to measure technical efficiency. In
order to obtain consistent estimates of all the parameters, we
can estimate a system composed of a production function and the
first order cost minimizing conditions; or alternatively, estimate
the set of derived input demand equations. According to Schmidt
and Lovell (1979, p. 357) the simpler choice is to apply a Maximum
Likelihood Estimator (MLE) to the production function and the first
order conditions. Assuming a C-D technology, the Lagranglan and first
order conditions are:

13Schmidt and Lovell (1979, p.357)
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(5.1)

Z - PkK + P]L + PfF + g Y - A Ka Lb Fc
Pk - A a Ka_1 Lb Fc - 0
Pi - A b Ka Lb_1

Fc - 0

Pf - A c Ka Lb Fc_1

-0

Y - A Ka Lb Fc ■ 0
Using price of labor as Che numeraire, these conditions can be
rewritten as:
(5.2)

lnPk - lnPi - ln(a/b * L/K)
InPf - InPi - ln(c/b * L/F)
In Y » InA + a In K + b In L + c In F

In the absence of technical or allocative inefficiencies, equations
(5.2) will compose the original system to be estimated.
A firm's production process can be Inefficient in two ways,
only one of which can be detected by an estimated production function
alone. Technical inefficiency occurs when the firm fails to maximize
output given its input bundle.

This results in a proportional

overutilization of all inputs. Allocative inefficiency occurs when
the firm does not equate MC^>MCj for i different from j; i.e. when
first order conditions do not hold exactly. This results in utiliza
tion of inputs in the wrong proportions, given input prices. If we
assume that the firm is allocatlvely efficient, we can derive a cost
function as follows:
1. From the first order conditions:
(5.3)

K* -

Px/Pjt * a/b

*L

F* -

Pj/Pf * c/b

* L

2. From the C-D production function:
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(5.4) Y « A Ka Lb Fc ev_u,
we obtain L*,
(5.5) L* - Y1/* A“l^r (Px/Pk*a/b)-a/r (Pi/Pf*c/b)"c/r
3. Substituting L* In the Input demand equations and simplifying:
(5.6) K* -

A”*/* Y 1/* (Pi/Pk*a/b)(r-a)/r (Pl/Pf*c/b)-c/r e-(v-u)/r

F* -

A*1/' Y 1/* (Pl/Pk*a/b)“a/r (Pi/Pf*c/b) ( « ) / * e-(.v-u)/t

4. Substituting F* and K* In the cost equation, and normalizing
with respect to Pi (In logarithmic form):
(5.7)

In (C/Pi) - G + 1/rlnY - a/r ln(Pi/Pk) - c/r ln(Pi/Pf) l/r(v-u)

where
G ■ In r - 1/r In A - 1/r In (aa + bb + cc)
r ■ a + b + c
P - price of capital, labor, fuel
C - total cost of production
5. When estimating a short run cost function, Kg Is fixed, and
the cost function can be derived following the same procedure as
for the long run cost function; presented In logarithmic form the
short run coat function is as follows (normalised with respect
to Pi):
(5.8) In (C-PkK0)/Pi

- G - a/r lnK0 + 1/r InY - c/r ln(Pi/Pf)
- 1/r (v-u)

where
G - A

(c/b)® + (c/b)b -!/r

In order to Incorporate technical and allocative Inefficien
cies in the estimating equations, we can amend eq. (5.2) as follows:

82
(5.9)

In Y =■ InA + alnK + blnL + clnF + (v-u)
lnPfc -

lnP3 ln(a/b * L/K) + e2

InPf -

InPi -

ln(c/b * L/F)

+

e3

The stochastic production function specifies output of each firm
as being bounded above by a frontier that is stochastic In the sense
that its placement is allowed to vary randomly across firms. The firm
is allowed to be technically inefficient relative to its own fron
tier. Interfirm variation of the frontier captures the effects of
exogenous shocks beyond the control of the firm. The disturbance
term (v-u) in eq. (5.3) is made up of two parts: a symmetric compo-.
*

nent v capturing this randomness outside the control of the firm, and
a one-sided component u capturing randomness under the control of the
firm. The latter is technical inefficiency. Allocative inefficiency
appears in eq. (5.9) as the disturbances from the exact satisfaction
of the first order condition for cost minimization* (e2>< 0, e3><0).
In order to discriminate among the various components of the
residuals, we need to make assumptions about v, u, and ej. Several
distributions of the disturbances can be hypothesized. As mentioned
in the third chapter, the choice of a distribution for the disturban
ces is done without much theoretical guidance. Schmidt and Lovell
(1979,

p.349) state that cthere

assume a given

is noparticular

distribution for the

good reason

disturbanceterm.

to

The onlyreal

solution is to try various alternative distributions and see which
fits best.*^

l^Aigner, Schmidt and Lovell (27) estimated a production
function assuming disturbance (u) to be distributed with a
half-normal and an exponential. The results indicated that the
parameters of the production function were very close. As for the
estimates of technical inefficiency, they were also very close.

This research assumes that the distribution of the one-sided
error term, u, is a positive half-normal; it is the absolute value
of a variable distributed as N (0, s^u)* The symmetric component v
is assumed to be distributed as N (0,s^v), It is assumed that there
is no systematic tendency to over or under utilize any input relative
to any other input given true internal prices; therefore, e^ « (e2>
e3> has a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and
covariance matrix!

It is also assumed that e^ is independent of v

and u^a
The following information is obtained from estimate of eq. (5.9)
(Schmidt and Lovell, 1979, p. 356); estimates of:
(a) parameters of the production function,
(b) s^v , which specifies the stochastic character of the product
ion function,
(c) s^u , from which we can obtain an estimate of the mean of u,
which represents the average deviation from the frontier due
to technical efficiency,
(d) I , which specifies the distribution of the disturbances in
the set of first order conditions, from which allocative
efficiency can be measured.
The MLE of eq.(5.9) requires a proper likelihood function. This

15The Averch-Johnson effect, if it exists, be explicit in the input
demand functions. Therefore, the e^ represents deviations from the
optimal input use after the A-J effect is controlled.
l^Those assumptions are taken from Schmidt and Lovell (1979).
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likelihood function can be derived from the assumptions made about
the disturbance terms of the original system (v, u, ej). By assump
tion. the density of e± is the density of N(0,£):
(5.10) g(e^) ■

£2j-l/2exp -1/2 e'Z“^e

The density of (v-u) represents

the sum of a symmetric normal

random variable and a truncated normal random variable:
(5.11) f(v-u) - 2/s f*((v-u)/s)[l - F*((v-u)ds-1)J
where s ■ /~(s2u+ s2v); d “ su/sv ; and f*(*) and F*(*) are the
standard normal density and the cumulative distribution functions,
respectively. Since (v-u) is assumed to be Independent of e^, the
joint density of e-t and (v-u) is the product of g(e^) and f(v-u).
The likelihood function is, therefore:
(5.12)

l-(21r)-1[£]-1/2exp -l/2^e'S^e]

2/s f*((v-u)/s)

[l-F((v-u)d/sf|
the relevant log-likelihood function becomes:
(5.13) L - -ln(2ir)-l/21n[£] -1/2E(et'Zet)+ ln(2/s)
+

Inf((v-u)/s) + In l-F((v-u)d/8)

where
£ : represents the variance-covariance matrix of e^
s22 : (In K- In L - In Pj/Pk “ lna/b)2
s23 : l/TST (ln K - In F - In Pf/Pfc - lna/c)
This log-likelihood function can be maximized numerically with
respect to the parameters (A, a, b, c, s, r and £) to obtain the
maximum likelihood estimates. He can find the optimizing values
with an algorithm such as Davldon-Fletcher-Povell (DFP).

FIFTH CHAPTER
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
1- Introduction
The second chapter outlines relations between property rights
structures of various ownership forms and the concept of efficiency;
while

the third and fourth chapters have reviewed the empirical

models used to measure efficiency, and presented the technology and
models to be estimated, respectively. This chapter will present data
and results from estimation of the models developed in previous
chapters. The second section restates the testing procedure. The
third section explains the data used. The fourth section presents the
estimations and interprets the results with respect to efficiencies
of various organizational forms.
2- Presentation of the models
2.1 Dummy variable model
Several models will be estimated to measure efficiencies of
ownership structures. First, since most of the empirical litera
ture testing relative efficiency of ownership structures is based
on estimation of a dummy variable model, the following cost function
model is estimated:
(5.1) LnCC/Pi) - G + 1/r In Y - a/r In (Pi/Pfc) - c/r ln(Px/Pf)
+ di V + d2 Pub + d3 Coop + ej
where
Ln(C/Pi) - total cost of production normalized with
respect to price of labor, in logarithmic form,
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G - intercept term,
Y - output,
**k,l,f " price of capital, labor, fuel,
V - dummy variable accounting for vintages of technolo
gy, 0 for the first vintage embodied in plants built
between

1965-1968 and

1 for plants built between

1969-1973,
Pub - dummy variable accounting for ownership
structure, 0 for private and cooperative utilities, and
1 for public utilities,
Coop - dummy variable accounting for ownership structu
re, 0 for private and public utilities,

and

1 for

cooperative utilities,
r - returns to scale (a + b + c)
G, r, a, b, c, dj, d£, d3 - parameters to be estimated,
e^ - disturbance terms with N(0, s^e).
This cost function is derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function
under assumption of cost minimization. This model will be estimated
using OLS, and will provide us with baseline measures of efficiency
between ownership structures. The Information about relative effi
ciency is captured by the coefficients of the dummy variables d2 and
d32.2 Stochastic frontier Cobb-Douglas cost function
a)

Long run cost function

A second set of models is estimated using a stochastic frontier
Cobb-Douglas cost function. Since our data set (to be described in
the next section) most likely captures a combination of ex ante and
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ex post technology we estimate both long run and short run cost
functions. Assuming allocative efficiency, the long run cdst function
derivable from the Cobb-Douglas production function is as follows:
(5.2) Ln(C/Pi) - G + 1/r In Y - a/r In (Pi/Pfc) - c/r In (Pi/Pf)
+ dj V - 1/r (v-u)
where

G, r, Y, Pk,l,f* v > a * c, are as previously defined,
v -

symmetric

component

of

the

disturbance

term

capturing randomness outside the control of the firm,
distributed as N(0, s^v ) ,
u - one

sided

(non positive)

component

capturing

randomness under the control of the firm, distributed
half-normal with N(0, s2u) .

The stochastic frontier cost function presented In eq. (5.2) contains
factor prices as arguments. Its estimation provides evidence on the
magnitude and cost of total Inefficiency. However, with this cost
function model it is not possible to decompose the estimates of total
cost inefficiency into its technical and allocative portion. The long
run cost function is estimated for each organizational form.
The estimation procedure followed to estimate eq.(5.2) uses MLE
assuming that the distribution of the one sided error term, u,
is half normal while the symmetric component, v, is assumed to be
normally distributed.

The density function of (v-u) is (Aigner,

Schmidt and Lovell, 1977, p. 26):
(5.3) f(v-u) - 2/s f* (v-u)/s
where s -

(s2u+s2v )1/2.

1 - F*((v-u)ds“l)
- su/sv ; f* and F* are the standard

normal density and the cumulative distribution function respectively.
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The log-likelihood function using the density function (5.3) can
be maximized numerically with respect to the parameters (G, a, c,
r, s, d) In eq. (5.2) and eq. (5.3) to obtain the maximum likeli
hood estimates. The Davidon-Fletcher-Powell

(DFP) algorithm is

used to obtain the optimizing values.
Using the same stochastic frontier Cobb-Douglas cost function,
we estimate a model for private regulated electric utilities that
incorporates a regulatory constraint.

Following Pescatrice and

Trapani (1980, p. 261), we assume that the internal cost of capital
is defined as follows:
(5.4) P1^ - Pfc -

z (p - Pk)/(1 “ z)

where
P*k - internal price of capital for private utilities,
Pk ~ market price of capital (to be defined in the next
section),
z - regulatory constraint multiplier,
p - average rate of return by firm in current and previous
two years.
The regulatory constraint, z, is a measure of the tightness of
regulation. In the case where the allowable rate-of-return regulation
is set above the profit maximizing level, then regulation is ineffec
tive and z - 0. At the other extreme, if the allowable rate-of-return
is set equal to Pk, then z ■ 1. If z is binding on the private firm
(0 < z < I), the firm minimizes the internal total cost, C* - PjL +
PfF + P^kK* Th® estimation procedure follows the estimation of the
long run cost function except that Pk is replaced by P*k *n eq.(5.2).
To 'search for the appropriate specification of internal price of
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capital, we use the method employed by Pescatrice and Trapani,
whereby z Is assigned the values 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 (Pescatrice and
Trapani,

1980, p.

268)1.

The Information obtained from such a

model permits measurement of Inefficiency while the regulatory
distortion Is controlled for.
b) Short run cost function
Since our data are likely to capture a combination of ex ante and
ex post technology we need to estimate a short run stochastic
frontier Cobb-Douglas cost function. The model Is as follows:
(5.5) Ln (C-PfcKo)/?!

- G - a/(b+c) In K0 + l/(b+c) In Y
- c/(b+c) ln (P^/Pf) - (v-u)/(b+c)

where all parameters are as previously defined, and Kq is ths
fixed quantity of capital used at the plant.
The estimation of such a model will be done using MLE technique
and the likelihood function presented in eq.(5.3)

following the

procedure described with regard to eq. (5.2). This formulation of the
cost function has the advantage of eliminating the price of capital
from the estimation, and Pfc is difficult to measure, as we will see
in the next section. Furthermore, the regulatory distortion problem
over the internal P^ is solved. The estimation of this short run cost
function provides estimates of the parameters of the cost function
and an estimate of mean Inefficiency for each organizational form.

*The value of z Is unknown. Therefore, we assign different values
to z, and an overall significance of the models estimated with
various values of z (0.0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8) is computed comparing
R^, log-likelihood value and F statistics. The appropriate value
of z is selected given the highest values on those three statistical
tests.
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2.3 System of equations
a)

Long run Cobb-Douglas production function

In order to obtain separate estimates of technical and allocative
efficiencies for each ownership structure, we estimate a system of
equations as presented in eq.(5.6):
(5.6) ln(Y) - A + aln(K) + bln(L) + cln(F) + (v-u)
In(L) - ln(K) => ln(b/a * Pfe/Pl) + e2
ln(L) - ln(F) » ln(b/c * Pf/Px) + e3
where
Y - output
K - capital
L - labor
F - fuel
**k,l,f “ prices of capital,

labor and fuel respect

ively,
v - symmetric component capturing randomness outside
the control of managers,
u - one sided component capturing error under the
control of managers,
e^ - disturbances from the exact satisfaction of the
first order conditions with N(0, 8^e),
A, a, b, c - parameters to be estimated.
Technical inefficiency appears in the long run production function
and is measured by u. In order to calculate mean technical ineffi
ciency from the ancillary parameters we use the following formulas^

^Stevenson, 1980, p. 60.
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(1): su = s Cl/^l/(d2+l))],
su/sv, s «* ^ " ( s 2 u + s 2 v

),3

(2) E(u) - (/2//ir) * su; where d -

Estimates of d and s (the ancillary parame

ters) are obtained from the maximized likelihood function. Estimates
of E(u) can be interpreted as measures of mean inefficiency, while
E(u)/r represents the cost of mean technical inefficiency where r
measures the return to scale^. Allocative inefficiency is Introduced
in the first-order conditions. In this model, the disturbances ln the
first-order equations will be interpreted as measures of over/under
capitalization with ,respect to fuel and labor. The cost of technical
inefficiency is.measured as (l/r*u), while the cost of allocative,
inefficiency is measured as E-ln(r)^. Total cost of inefficiency is
the summation of the technical and allocative components.
Ve can estimate the system of equations (5.6) using MLE deriving
a proper likelihood function. Following Schmidt and Lovell

(79,

p.349), the density function for (v-u) is the same as the one .shown

3(1) s = (s2u + s2v)l/2
(2) d — su /sv
Following Aigner, schmidt and Lovell (1977, p. 26), this particu
lar parameterization of s and d (obtained from the derivation of
the density function of v-u) is convenient because d can be interpre
ted to be an indicator of the relative variability of the two sources
of random error that distinguish firms from one another. From those
definitions we can derive the formulas for su and E(u) as follows:
(3) sv = su/d
( 4 ) s =» (s2u + s2u /d2)l/2
(5) s - su (1 + 1/d2)1/2
(6) su = s [ i / V a + i / d 2n
while E(u) ■ (*2/inr)*su Is derived from the moments of u.
^The formula for the cost of mean technical efficiency is derived
from the Cobb-Douglas cost function (see eq. 5.7 ln chapter 4).
^E-lnr is the estimated cost of allocative inefficiency where
E = c/r * e3 + b/r * e2 + In a + c * exp(-03) + b * exp(-02) »
where a, b, c are parameters of the production function, e2 and
e3 are the mean residuals from the exact minimization of the first
order conditions in eq. (5.6). Lnr is the natural logarithm of the
estimate of the return to scale (r=*a+b+c).
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in eq.(5.3). We assume that ei=(e2»

has a multivariate normal

distribution:
(5.7) f(et) - (2TT)-1 [E -l]exp [-1/2 e'E^e ].
where j « £s22 S33/S23 S32] is the variance-covariance matrix of
e^.

By assumption,

(v-u) and ej are assumed to be Independent.

The joint density function is the product of
(5.8)

f £(v-u) ,e)=*(2

u [eJ)“ 1

f(v-u) and f(e£):

exp £-l/2e 'E - *e ](2/s)

f* £ (v-u)/s)]

[ 1 - F* ((v-u)d/s)].
The likelihood function associated with eq.(5.6)

and eq.

(5.8)

can be maximized numerically with respect to the parameters (A,
a, b, c, d, s , z )• These estimates will be

consistent and asymp

totically efficient.
b) Short run production function
The system of equations is also estimated using a short run
production function when Kq is fixed:
(5.9) Ln(Y) = G + a l n K Q + b l n L + c l n F +

(v-u)

Ln(F) - Ln (L) = ln p?i/Pf * c/b]+ e2
where all parameters are as previously defined.
From the estimation of the system of equations
and the log-likelihood function derived from

(5.9), using MLE

eq. (5.8), we

obtain

estimates of the parameters of the production function as well as the
ancillary parameters from which we can calculate mean technical and
allocative inefficiencies for each type of ownership structure. As
before, such model has the advantage of eliminating the measurement
problem of the price of capital.

2.4 Models to be estimated
In summary, the following models will be tested.
I. cost function with dummy variable
?. stochastic frontier cost function
2.1 long run cost function
2.1.1 private utilities
a) no adjustment for regulation
b) adjustment for regulation
d: 0.0, 0.2,.0.5,.0.8
2.1.2 public utilities
2.1.3 cooperative utilities
2.2 short run cost function
2.2.1 private utilities
2.2.2 public utilities
2.2.3 cooperative utilities
3. system of equations
3.1 long run production function
3.1.1 private utilities
a) no adjustment for regulation
b) adjustment for regulation
d: 0.0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8
3.1.2 public utilities
3.1.3 cooperative utilities
3.2 short run production function
3.2.1 private utilities
3.2.2 public utilities
3.2.3 cooperative utilities
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3- Data description
To measure comparative efficiency of various ownership struc
tures, we have selected the steam-electric generation Industry in the
U.S..

This

Industry shows interesting characteristics:

(1) three

different ownership structures are generating electricity using the
same technology (steam-electric generation with fossil fuels); (2)
standardized data for all three types of firms are available (produc
tion as well as financial data); (3) technology of steam-electric
utilities has been studied for over 25 years.
The data are measured at the plant

level**.

All plants built

after 1965 were considered. Plants prior to 1965 could not be used
because

the Federal Power Commission did not publish production

data relative to cooperative utilities. Plants with joint ownership
were dropped. Those plants selected are most likely to be of base
load characteristics rather than peak load?. The data for all
three types of ownership are a pooling, of cross-section and time
series of plants. They cover new plants built between 1965 and 1973®

**We have to recognize the influence of the aggregation process
(the firm being a gathering of plants) on the estimation of the
characteristics of technology as well as measures of technical
and allocative inefficiencies. For instance all measures of cost
inefficiency are directly related to measures of economies of
scale. Furthermore Aigner et all (77) have estimated technical
inefficiency on aggregated data and found very little evidence
of it.
?It makes sense to assume that new plants will be of base load
characteristics since technical change is mostly embodied in electri
city generation. Firms will have an incentive to use new plants (most
efficient ones) to satisfy base load demand if they behave as cost
minimizers.
®In this industry effects of technological changes are embodied in
capital. Thus, following conventional practice we have subdivided
this sample in two vintages according to the data of each plant's
initial year of operation.

for which the necessary data are available. The data are from the
first full year of operation through the fifth year. There were 37
plants built by privately owned electric utilities during that
period, providing 150 observations. Consumer cooperative utilities
constructed 16 plants, for 71 observations. Publicly owned utilities
were the least active group, building 9 plants from which 33 observa
tions were obtained.
Strong differences exist among the studies surveyed with respect
to measurement of the price and cost of capital. Dhrymes and Kurz
(1964) and McFadden (1964) estimated cost of capital as the estimated
value of the plant less non capital cost divided by a measure of
capital input. Nerlove (1963), Cowing (1974), Christensen and Greene
(1976) and Lovell and Schmidt (1979) estimated cost of capital as the
nominal interest rate on the firm's bonds prior to plant installa
tion. Petersen (^75) and Sowell (1978) estimated cost of capital
using the Jorgenson formulation of the annual rental price of
capital. Wilson (1976) used a discounted cash flow model to evaluate
the cost of common stock which he used as a proxy for cost of
capital. Finally, Stevenson (1980) and Pescatrice and Trapani (1980)
used a weighted average of the cost of debt, preferred and common
stock to estimate the cost of capital. Stevenson used a discounted
cash flow model

to estimate the financial cost of common stock

capital while Pescatrice and Trapani measured the cost of equity
capital by dividing dividend payments by the equity capital.
The cost of capital is the minimum rate of return necessary
to attract capital, and it can be defined as the expected rate of
return prevailing in capital markets on alternative investments

of equivalent risks^.

The cost of capital is a forward-looking

concept since it is an expected rate of return. Furthermore,

it

is an opportunity cost concept which depends on the risk of the
investment and is determined in capital markets. The cost of capital
for a company is a weighted average of the costs of capital for the
various investments of which the company is comprised. The capital
structure characterizing a company is a mix of debt and equity
(common and prefered stocks). According to Kolbe and Read (1984,
p.44) the cost of common equity capital is what poses a problem in
estimating the cost of capital. Return on preferred equity is equal
to preferred dividends divided by the book value of preferred stock
while the return on debt is equal to the interest expenses divided by
the book value of debt. Therefore, they focus only on discussing
problems related to estimates of cost of commmon stock. The cost of
preferred equity and the cost of debt can be observed directly ln the
market because the promised amount and timing of preferred dividends
and interest are fixed. Several methods to estimate cost of common
equity capital are reviewed and evaluated by Kolbe and Read (1984),
but only two will be discussed in this chapter, comparable earnings
and discounted cash flows models, since those are the methods found
in the empirical literature.
The comparable earnings (CE) method uses rates of return on
equity (ROE) of comparable risk investments. ROE is calculated by
taking net income earnings less interest and taxes, and preferred
dividends; and dividing by the summation of common stock, paid-in

^This paragraph draws from Kolbe et al. (1984), and from Vilson
(1976).
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capital and retained earnings, less treasury stocks. Common stock
Is the par-value of common shares Issued, retained earnings Is the
cumulative net Income that has not been distributed as either
preferred or common dividends, and pald-ln-capital is the excess
over par value

that was received when the shares were issued.

Treasury stocks represent the book value of common shares that
have been reacquired by the company since they were issued. Kolbe
and Read (p. 45) argue that comparable earnings is a poor method
to evaluate

the true cost of capital from the point of view of

the regulator: (1) it is hard to select firms of comparable risks,
(2) the cost of capital is Inferred from the book rate of return for
these comparable risk companies, (3) the book rate of return is based
on generally accepted accounting principles but it will only equate
the true rate of return by accident (accountants exercise considera
ble discretion in the application of generally accepted accounting
principles), (4) book earnings do not distinguish between excess and
normal returns since no adjustment for security prices is considered,
(5) the accounting concepts of income and value are not the same as
the corresponding economic concepts (asset values are historical
costs and are different from market values or replacement costs), (6)
depreciation to write down systematically the original cost of assets
is different from the change in the value of an asset, and

(7)

accounting errors due to inflation vary across asset life. According
to Kolbe and Read (p.49), the most serious problems are the histori
cal cost principle and the accounting depreciation schedule.
The objective of our research is not to determine what should be
the appropriate rate of return that should be allowed to the regula

ted private firm. Instead we are interested ln determining the cost
of capital facing a firm. The problems outlined above are related to
estimates of the cost of common stock, which represents only one type
of capital used by private firms. Long term debt is the most impor
tant source of fund, contributing more then 50% of all capital used.
Therefore, the comparable earnings method, which was the most widely
used method of estimating cost of capital by regulators through the
late 70's, can still be appropriate to estimate cost of capital for
private regulated firms in our study.
The discounted cash flow model (DCF) estimates the cost of equity
capital as: r - Dj/Pq + g, where r is the estimated cost of capital,
Di is the dividends that stockholders received in period 1, g is the
estimated long term growth rate of dividends and Po is the common
stock price at the end of period 1. A potential problem with the DCF
model is the steady growth assumption. It is difficult to apply when
the company is in a transition between growth paths. On average, the
DCF method gets good results in estimating cost of capital when times
are stable, and is widely used by regulatory commissions (much less
so in the early 70's) (Kolbe et al., p.60).
Even though the DCF method seems superior to the CE method,
we used the CE method because

(1) most regulatory commissions

used such method to determine the allowed rate of return between
1965-1975,

(2) the distortion is affecting only a portion of the

capital structure and (3) the data required were more easily availa
ble.
The estimation of the cost of capital for publicly-owned and
cooperatives utilities is a simpler problem since their capital

structures are fairly straightforward.

In the case of publicly-

owned utilities, the structure of capital is composed primarily
of long term debt, retained earnings, and other government sources of
capital. The cost of long term debt is readily known, and the cost of
equity is approximated using the rate on treasury bills maturing in
10 years. The structure of capital of cooperative utilities is even
simpler since it is composed almost entirely of long term debt
obtained through REA at a rate set by law of 2% until 1971. For many
cooperatives,

their loans and utility plant (at cost) are •almost

identical. When cooperatives showed equity, its cost was approximated
using the same rate of treasury bills maturing in 10 years as used
for public utilities.
In this research the variables used in estimation were measured
as follows. Output is the net generation of electricity measured in
millions of KWH/year. Host other studies of electric utilities have
used such a measure of output (see Kopp and Smith (1980), Schmidt and
Lovell

(1979), Pescatrice and Trapani

(1980), Dhrymes and Kurz

(1964), McFadden (1964), Nerlove (1963), Petersen (1975), Christensen
and Greene

(1976)).

Capital was measured as cost of plants ln

thousands of dollars*® (see Lovell and Schmidt (1979), Pescatrice and
Trapani (1980), Komiya (1962), Courville

(1974), Barzel

(1964),

McFadden (1964), Bellnfante (1969)). Other measures, such as instal
led generating equipment (also referred to as nameplate capacity)
(Barzel (1964)) and net continuous plant capability (Sowell (1978)
were used. Fuel was measured in millions of BTU burned per year. All
researchers referred to previously measured input fuel in terms of

*®The price of land and land rights is excluded.

BTU burned per

year. Labor was measured

in average numbers of

employees * 2000 hours per year. Again most

researchers have used

this measure. The price of fuel was measured as cost per million BTU,
measure which is provided by the FPC on a plant basis. The price
of labor was measured as total cost of maintenance production
divided by total hours worked per year. A few researchers used a
regional average wage as a proxy for price of labor (Nerlove (1963),
Lovell and Schmidt (1979), Pescatrice and Trapani (1980)). Those
studies used an estimate of the manufacturing wage rate of the state
in which the firm operates. The price of capital for private regula
ted firm was measured as the sum of interest on long term debt +
dividend on preferred and common stock divided by long term debt +
equity (common and preferred stocks issued). The price of capital for
publicly owned utilities was measured as the sum of Interest on long
term debt + cost of equity capital** divided by long term debt +
(investment of municipality + retained earnings). The price of
capital for cooperative utilities was measured as the sum of interest
on long term debt + cost of equity capital divided by long term debt
+ total net worth.
The descriptive characteristics of the sample used for the three
types of ownership forms are presented in table 1:

**As a proxy for cost of equity capital cost of long term govern
ment bond maturing in 10 years has been used for public and coopera
tives.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics (mean)
standard deviation in parentheses

output (000,000 Kwh)
capital ($)

public

1823.5
(993)

1281.1
(1115)

46.996.000
(29,738,000)
0.0732
(0.0214)

Pk (%)
fuel (000,000 BTU)

Pf ($/000,000 BTU)

labor

(hours/plant/year)
Pi

private^

($/hours)

18.068.000
(9,414,900)
0.475
(0.414)
100,720
(51,626)
5.636
(3.659)

33.887.000
(28,208,000)
0.0521
(0.0109)

cooperative
1064.1
(781)
27.100.000
(17,094,000)
0.0208
(0.0048)

12.721.000
(10,624,000)

11.141.000
(7,921,900)

0.542
(0.566)

0.321
(0.327)

116,550
(89,643)
4.181
(3.055)

79,352
(42,598)
3.794
(2.37)

Models will be estimated with respect to samples of plants of public
utilities, cooperative utilities, small plants private utilities,
large plants private utilities as well as full sample of private
plants.

4- Results and interpretations
4.1 Dummy variable cost function
The

first model estimated is the Cobb-Douglas cost function

with dummy variables on a pooling of data for all three types of

l^The full sample of private plants shows much higher mean values
for data measurements. Therefore, to make samples more compara
ble, the private sample has been divided into plants with output
smaller than 3500 millions of KWH/year, and into plants with output
larger than 3500 millions of KWH/year. The first sample contains 75
observations and shows a mean output of 1823.5 millions of KWH, while
the sample of large plants has a mean output of 6099.8 millions of
Kwh/year.
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firms. Results are presented in Table 2.13
Table 2
OLS estimates of Cobb-Douglas cost function,eq.5.I,
with dummy variables
using a pooled of samples (253 observations)
t-ratios ln parentheses
constant
K

output Pl/Pk Pl/Pf
1/r
a/r
c/r

V
dj

Pub
d.2

Coop
d3

10.687
0.844 -0.138 -0.722 0.125 -.013 -.129
(109.25) (63.08) (-6.84)(-43.6) (6.37) (-.42) (-4.92)
R-square
: .978
F-statistic : 1841.4

The first dummy variable accounts for vintages; all plants built
between

1965-1968 take a 0 value while all plants built between

1969-1973 take a value of 1. The results are statistically signifi
cant and indicate that the second vintage group shows higher cost of
production than the first vintage group. Moreover, the cost differen
ce between the two vintage groups represents 13.3Z. The other two
dummy variables account for ownership structures. Private firms are
the control group, Pub has a value of 1 for public firms and 0 for
privates and cooperatives, Coop has a value of 1 for cooperatives and
0 for privates and publics. Both dummy variables have negative 6igns

indicating that private firms are the least efficient

type of

ownership structure. Only the coefficient of Coop is significantly
different from zero. Moreover, its magnitude Indicates a difference
of

13.76Z between cost of production for private and cooperative

l^when this cost function is estimated using the sample of small
private plants combined with the sample of public and cooperati
ves, the cost difference between private and cooperative utili
ties reduces to 10.3Z and is statistically significant.
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utilities*^.
4.2 Stochastic frontier Cobb-Douglas cost function
a)

Long run cost function

Results from the second model eq. 5.2, are obtained from maximum
likelihood estimates of the stochastic frontier Cobb-Douglas cost
function assuming that firms are allocatively efficient. Estimates
are presented

in Tables

3 and 4.15 The cost function has been

estimated for each sample of types of firms. Furthermore, ln the case
of the private regulated firms, the model has also been estimated to
account for the regulation effect by using the internal price of
capital, as presented in equation (5.4)16. The regulatory constraint
multiplier, z, was given the values of 0.0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 while p
(the allowed rate of return) was measured as an average of actual

l^Cost difference between private and cooperative:
(Cco - Cpr)/Cpr "
" eb " 1
_ e.129 _ i m 1.1376 - 1 - .1376.
Therefore, the cost difference between cooperative and private
utilities is 13.76%.
l^Those results were obtained by numerical techniques which implies
maximizing the log-likelihood function by choice of the unknown
parameters G, a, c, r, s, d. Starting values are provided by estima
tes of the OLS/moments method. The program used is Llmdep (written by
W. Greene). The maximization of the likelihood function was done with
the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm (Greene, 1980, pp. 41.1-41.5)
which is very popular and has proved very efficient in many applica
tions (Judge, Griffiths', Hill and Lee, 1980, p. 734). The estimation
of the asymptotic variance of MLE is calculated from the inverse of
the Information matrix (Kmenta, 1971, p. 160). Limdep uses the Berndt
et al. estimator to calculate the asymptotic variance matrix for the
MLE when FRON is used to estimate stochastic frontier cost function
(Greene, 1980, p. 16-1). When the User Defined Minimization routine
is used to estimate the system of equations (see results presented ln
tables 10, 11, 12), Limdep minimizes the likelihood function using
DFP and the information matrix is approximated using a formula given
ln Greene, 1980, p. 41-4.
*6()nly the full sample of private plants was used to estimate the
long run cost function while accounting for the regulatory effect.
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rates earned by the firm during the current and previous two years
(Pescatrice and Trapani (1980, p.275).
The results from the stochastic frontier long run cost function
give us estimates of the parameters of the cost function (from which
we could derive parameters of the production function) and the
ancillary parameters, from which we can calculate the mean technical
inefficiency and its cost!?. Mean inefficiency was lowest for
cooperatives, 7.8%. Publicly-owned utilities show a mean inefficiency
of

13.1%.

However,

results obtained for private utilities after

dividing the sample into small and large plants show a mean ineffi
ciency of 13.9% for smaller private utilities, showing a cost due to
mean technical inefficiency of 11.27%. The cost due to mean ineffi
ciency was

lowest for cooperatives, 6.5%, with public utilities

showing 11.6% of its cost being caused by its technical inefficiency.
The larger plants show a mean inefficiency of 27.14% for a cost of
mean technical Inefficiency of 27.2%.

The introduction of the

regulatory constraint ln the estimated cost function (using the full
sample of private plants) affected the results for mean inefficiency
only slightly. Mean inefficiency was lowest for private utilities
when z 3 0.2, and E(u) - 20.11%, as table 4

s h o w s

*8. Only when z was

equal to 0.8 did the estimation of mean inefficiency Increased to

l?See footnote # 3 for a discussion of mean technical inefficiency and
its cost.
l^The highest R^a value is obtained when z«. 2 which also shows the
value of InL and the highest F statistics.
R^InL
F statistics
z - 0.0 .910
378.7
44.5
45.6
z - 0.2 .914
385.5
z - 0.5 .908
43.6
358.9
z ■ 0.8 .881
13.7
171.9
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24.1%. The cost of mean technical Inefficiency is highest for private
utilities, around 16.7% when z ■ .2.
Table 3
Stochastic frontier
Long run Cobb-Douglas cost function
(asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses)
type of owner.

constant
K

output
1/r

priv (z=0)
(J50 observ.)

10.490
(61.4)

0.8359
(29.5)

-0.153 -0.679
(-3.15) (-15.2)

0.910
.183
(4.89)

priv(z=.2)
(150 obs.)

10.557
(59.5)

0.831
(29.3)

-0.155 -0.679
(-3.33) (-15.6)

.169
0.914
(4.61)

priv(z“ .5)
(146 obs.)

10.653
(56.3)

0.817
(28.6)

-0.141 -0.684
(-3.53) (-15.6)

0.908
.129
(3.49)

priv(z».8)
(98 obs.)

10.466
(39.1)

0.781
(20.8)

-0.027 -0.708
(-1.14) (-11.3)

0.881
.123
(2.05)

priv (small)
(75 obs.)

10.889
(50.48)

0.807
(33.2)

-0.136 -0.736
(-3.39) (-19.9)

0.958

priv (large)
(75 obs.)

9.235
(6.17)

1.002 -0.158 -0.711
(4.95) (-1.09) (-6.42)

0.746

Pl/Pk
a/r

Pl/Pf
c/r

public firms
(33 observ.)

10.047
(38.6)

0.880
(31.9)

-0.018 -0.819
(-0.26) (-13.9)

cooperatives
(71 observ.)

10.181
(80.6)

0.829
(56.1)

-0.025
(0.91)

-0.777
(-47.6)

V
<*1

-.113
(-1.1)

R2a

0.990

.039
0.983
(1.97)
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Table 4
Stochastic frontier
Long run cost function
Estimates of ancillary parameters (technical and cost inefficiencies)
(asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses)
type of ownership

sigma(s)

lambda(d)

E(u)

E(u)/r

private

.2767
(34.3)

2.399
(7.86)

.2038
(26.66)

.1704

priv (reg = 0.2)

.2737
(34.8)

2.361
(8.15)

.2011
(27.21)

.1677

priv (reg = 0.5)

.2738
(34.97)

2.319
(8.71)

.2006
(28.30)

.1639

priv (reg = 0.8)

.3257
(23.9)

2.482
(5.66)

.2410
.1883
(19.79)

priv (small)

.1918
(4.53)

2.236
(2.64)

.1397
(3.79)

priv (large)

.3723
(15.6)

2.248
(4.99)

.2714
.2725
(14.18)

public

.1670
(6.37)

5.133
(1.61)

cooperative

.1033
(5.79)

2.995
(2.00)

.131
(6.35)
.0782
(5.04)

.1127

.116

.065

The estimated inefficiencies for private utilities are
i those obtained by Schmidt and Lovell (1979). Using
privately owned steam electric generating plants constructed in the
U.S. between 1947 and 1965, they showed a mean technical inefficiency
of 15.75% which Increased cost of production by 12.6%. Kopp and Smith
(1980) estimated a stochastic frontier production function for 43
private and public steam electric generating plants built between
1961 and 1972 using a pooling of cross section and time series data
from 1969 and 1973. After dividing the period into two vintages they
obtained an estimate of mean technical inefficiency of 18.87% for the
oldest vintage while their measure dropped to 5.l3% for the youngest

vintage. Finally. Stevenson (1980) estimated a translog cost function
using a sample of 81 observations of electrical private utilities
in 1970. His result indicates a mean technical Inefficiency of
14.86%.
To test whether mean Inefficiencies are significantly different
from one another we test for the difference between two

means

Letting the true mean of the first population be ui and the mean of
the second population be u£» the null hypothesis is Hq: uj=U2. The
appropriate test statistic from which we can define the acceptance
and the critical region with the help of normal probability tables

is^O:
(5.10) Z = £ (mean Xj-mean X2) - (U1-U2)^//"(s^/nj+s^/^)
where X} and X2 are means of the respective samples.

8^1

and 8^2

are variances of the respective samples, and ni* n2 sample sizes.
Table 5
Test for difference between two means
(1) priv(full)/coop

: Z ■ 68.31

(2) priv(full)/public

: Z - 8.23

(3) public/cooperative

: Z ■ 13.56

(4) priv(small)/coop

: Z » 13.30

(5) prlv(8mall)/public

: Z ® 1.61

critical value of 1.96

For all tests, except prlv(small)/public, between two means presented
in table 5. we have to reject the null hypothesis that both means are
l^Kmenta (1971, p.136)
20we can still use that test even though populations are not assumed to
be normal since the sample size is greater than 30.
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equal at 95Z confidence, Z<

1.96.

The confidence Intervals for the mean inefficiencies of each
sample are presented In table 6, and calculated using^:

(5.11)

Xj - Za/2 * S£, Xj + Za/2 * si where X^ Is mean technical Ineffi
ciency, Za/2 Is the critical value and

Is the asymptotic standard

deviation of X^.
Table 6
Asymptotic confidence Interval
private

.1888 < X^ <.2188

public

.0799 < X± <.1817

cooperative

.0478 < X^ <.1086

private (small)

.0676 < X^ <.2176

critical value of 1.96

Results presented in Tables 3-6 suggest that consumer coope
ratives are the most efficient type of ownership. Three different
tests have been performed:

1) an asymptotic t-test,

2) a test

for differences between means, and 3) the asymptotic confidence
interval for each sample. From those tests, we can establish that
results obtained from stochastic frontier long run cost functions
confirm our conclusions derived from the simple dummy variable
model.

Furthermore,

they provide us with the magnitude of mean

inefficiency for each ownership structure. However, the effect of
size of plants on technical inefficiency cannot be overlooked
since mean Inefficiency nearly doubles when It Is taken into effect.
^Following Judge, Griffiths, Hill and Lee (1980, p.753), it is not
necessary to assume normally distributed errors for setting up
confidence interval as presented in Table 6.
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b)

Short run cost function

The model presented ln equation (5.5) has been estimated, and
results are presented in Tables 7 and 8. The estimation of this short
run cost function provides estimates of the parameters of the cost
function and an estimate of the mean technical inefficiency for
private

(small plants,

large plants and full sample of private

plants) and cooperative utilities. This formulation of the cost
function eliminates the problem related to the measurement of price
of capital since

does not appear in the cost function.

Results from this model were obtained from maximum likelihood
estimates of the stochastic frontier short run Cobb-Douglas cost
function assuming that firms are allocatively efficient.

I
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Table 7
Stochastic frontier
Short run Cobb-Douglas cost f u n c t i o n ^
(asymptotic t-ratlos In parentheses)
type of owner.

constant
G

output
l/(b+c)

private firms
(150 observ.)

7.623
(4.25)

0.724
(5.22)

0.187 -0.886 0.031
(1.23) (-12.7) (.32)

0.925

priv(small)
(75 observ.)

8.699
(36.6)

0.769
(50.7)

0.118 -0.923 0.002
(6.15) (-98.2) (.15)

0.995

priv(large)
(75 observ.)

7.714
(2.08)

0.604
(1.65)

0.223 -0.825 0.107
(0.74) (-5.41) (.61)

0.784

cooperative^
(71 observ.)

9.841
(26.9)

0.901
(44.8)

-0.853
(-68.1)

0.984

capital
a/(b+c)

-0.015
(-0.53)

Pl/Pf
V
c/(b+c) dj

R2a

Table 8
Stochastic frontier
Short run cost function
Estimates of ancillary parameters (technical and cost inefficiency
(asymptotic t-ratlos in parentheses)
type of ownership

sigma

lambda

E(u) l/(b+c)*E(u)

private

.2563
(18.4)

1.319
(9.13)

.1629
(12.82)

.1181

priv(small)

.0590
(6.31)

2.083
(2.17)

.0446
(4.66)

.0343

priv(large)

•34p5
(8.04)

1.305
(4.62)

.2213
(6.04)

.1336

cooperative

.1170
(8.72)

5.9727
(1.862)

.0921
(8.459)

.0829

2^The stochastic frontier cost function could not be estimated using
the data for public utilities because the third moments of OLS
residuals has wrong sign. Limdep uses the COLS method to generate
starting values for MLE, and abort when the third moments of OLS has
the wrong sign.
2^The function could not converge when the stochastic frontier short
run cost function was estimated using a dummy variable to account for
vintages on cooperative data set.
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Inefficiency was lowest for small private plants, 4.46%, while
cooperatives showed a mean inefficiency of 9.21%. No results were
obtained for public utilities.

The cost inefficiency of small

private plants represented 3.43% of overall costs while cooperative
firms showed a cost inefficiency of 8.29%. However, large private
plants are less efficient than small private and cooperatives and
show a mean inefficiency of 22.13% . Furthermore, calculating the
confidence interval for each sample, using eq.

(5.11), we find

that the confidence interval for private and cooperative utilities
are as presented in table 9:
Table 9
Asymptotic confidence interval

private

.1381 < Xj < .1879

priv (small)

.0246 <

priv (large)

.1494 < Xj < .2932

cooperative

.0708 < X^ < .1134

< .0603

critical value of 1.96

4.3 System of equations
a) Long run production function
Estimating the system of equations (5.6) using maximua likeli
hood* we obtain the results presented in tables 10 and 11.
For private utilities, the system of equations was estimated
using the different values of the regulatory constraints for the
full sample. The regulatory constraint may be especially Important
in distinguishing technical and allocative inefficiencies for private
regulated firms.
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Table 10
System of equations consisting of
Long run production function, and first order conditions
(asymptotic t-ratlos in parentheses)
V
dl

log L
(value)

type of
ownership

constant
A

capital
a

fuel
c

priv(z=0)
150 obs.

-9.681
(-27.8)

.301
(25.55)

.685
(39.48)

.0618
(16.59)

-.182
-47.79
(-4.86)

priv(z=*. 2)
150 obs.

-9.679
(-27.9)

.292
(24.38)

.694
(40.21)

.0627
(16.49)

-.179
-41.55
(-4.85)

priv(z=>.5)
146 obs.

-9.546
(-26.9)

.266
(20.62)

priv(z=.8)
98 obs.

-9.131
(-17.6)

.205
(7.09)

.747
(31.85)

.0664
(10.52)

-.101
(-1.36

priv(small) -11.47
75 obs.
(-21.1)

.324
(17.6)

.772
(24.75)

.0512
(11.75)

-.129
-91.5
(-3.69)

priv(large) -5.30
75 obs.
(-46.9)

.225
(9.78)

.520
(12.56)

.0599
(6.98)

-.146
-17.4
(-.114)

-10.94
(15.65)

.251
(9.58)

.804
(14.2)

.0621
(7.23)

-47.1
-.096
(0.82)

.0798
(9.65)

-11.99
-.073
(2.66)

public
33 obs.

cooperative -11.05
71 obs.
(15.63)

.172
(13.67)

.711
(39.06)

.876
(49.0)

labor
b

.0654
(13.34)

-.178
(-4.58)

-16.35

+84.5

Table 11
Estimates of ancillary parameters
Derived from the system of equations
type of
ownership

sigma(s)
s

lambda
d

S22

S33

S23

8u

private

.3170
(25.98)

3.822
(3.75)

.365
(7.86)

.605
(9.3)

.308
(6.1)

.307

private
(z=0.2)

.3159
(26.37)

3.833
(3.79)

.394
(7.59)

.604
(9.24)

.317
(5.9)

.306

private
(z=0.5)

.3181
(26.72)

3.987
(3.73)

.532
(7.03)

.614
(8.63)

.371
(5.1)

.309

private
(z=0.8)

.3437
(24.32)

6.323
(2.936)

2.28
(5.99)

.696
(6.26)

.730
(3.1)

.339

priv(small) .2275
(9.23)

40.07
(0.13)

.252
(5.56)

.540
(4.80)

.236
.227
(4.66)

prlv(large) .3211
(16.98)

100.03
(0.08)

.337
(17.90)

.619
(6.01)

.280
.320
(3.27)

3.557
(1.48)

.141
(3.26)

.567
(2.16)

.157
(2.1)

.181

.328
(4.52)

.575
(5.15)

.328
(4.0)

.022

public

.1878
(4.10)

cooperative .0744
(0.55)

0.309
(0.03)

Table 12
Estimates of Inefficiency
Total coi
ineffici*

type of ownership

E(u)

E(u)/r

E-lnr

private (z=0.0)

.244

.233

.0413

.2743

private (z=0.2)

.243

.233

.0427

.2757

private (z=»0.5)

.245

.236

.0400

.2760

private (z=0.8)

.269

.264

.0644

.3284

private (small plants)

.181

.158

.0441

.2018

private (large plants)

.254

.315

.0405

.3560

public

.144

.129

.0430

.1720

cooperative

.017

.015

.0280

.0430
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Our results

Indicate measures of technical inefficiency, for

full sample of private plants, E(u), ranging from 24.4% to 26.9%
depending on the value of the regulatory constraint; and, there
fore, the internal price of capital. Using the formula for computing
cost of mean inefficiency, E(u)/r (Schmidt and Lovell, 1979, p.355),
it ranges from 23.3% to 26.42%. Measures of allocative inefficiency,
E-lnr, where E =

c/r*e3 + b/r*e2

+ In a + c*exp(-e3) + b*exp(-e2)

and lnr is the logarithmic value of estimated returns to scale
(Schmidt and Lovell, 1979, p. 356), ranged from 4.00% to 6.44%.
technical inefficiency is 18.1%

Mean

and 25.4% for small and large

private plants, respectively. Public utilities were found to have
mean technical inefficiency of 14.4% and mean allocative inefficiency
of 4.3%. Cooperatives had a 1.7% mean technical inefficiency and a
2.8% mean allocative inefficiency.
The only estimation of technical and allocative inefficiencies
using private electric utilities comes from Schmidt and Lovell
(1979).

Estimating a system of equations similar to the system

presented in eq.(5.6) they report a mean value for E- lnr ■ .081
which indicates that allocative inefficiency raises cost by 8.1%.
They show a mean cost technical inefficiency of 8.4% for a total
cost inefficiency of 16.5%.
Residuals from the cost minimization equations (eq. 5.6), e2
and 63, can be observed for each observation. They measure allocative
inefficiency for the capital/fuel (K/F) and capital/labor
ratios, respectively.

(K/L)
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Table 13
Estimates of residuals of F.O.C., from e2 and 63 from the
system of equations

0.0

private
(value of z)
0.8
0.2
0.5

public

co-op

of K/L (mean)
(var)
(max)
(min)

.038
.304
1.661
-1.557

.082 .043 .509
.303 .304 .307
1.70 1.66 2.13
-1.51 -1.51 -1.55

-.013
.141
.877
-.814

-.033
.327
1.117
-1.547

of K/F (mean)
(var)
(max)
(min)

-.001
.368
1.570
-1.464

.044 .179 .477
.367 .367 .367
1.615 1.750 2.048
-1.42 -•1.28 -■0.98

.163
.368
.999
-1.166

.079
.239
.792
-2.063

The means of the residuals of e2 and e3 for each ownership structure
are presented In table 13, along with their variances, and maximum
and minimum values across all observations. From the means of the
residuals of K/F and K/L we can establish how far each ownership
structure Is from using Inputs In the right proportion. Results from
table 13 Indicate that estimates of the means of e2 and 63 are close
to zero. It shows only- mild over-capitallzatlon for capital with
respect to fuel for all ownership types. For example, public utili
ties use a K/F which is only 16.3% higher than optimal. Private firms
exhibit over-capitallzatlon with respect to labor also. Moreover,
public and cooperative firms show over-laborlzation with respect to
capital. These results differ slightly from Schmidt and Lovell (1979,
p.360) who find higher and positive over-capitalization with respect
to both fuel and labor among private firms. They obtained a capi
tal/fuel ratio that was, on average,

73% higher than the cost

minimizing ratio while the capital/labor ratio was 36% higher than
the cost minimizing ratio.
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The results obtained from the system of equations confirmed
the position of consumer cooperatives as the most efficient ownership
structures. Publicly-owned utilities come in second followed by the
private regulated (small or large plants) firms which appear to be
the least efficient ownership structure. Furthermore, the results
indicate that most of the total cost of inefficiency is made up of
technical inefficiency. With respect to private regulated firm, this
is in contradiction to the general belief that inefficiency is caused
by rate of return regulation. We do not find the over-capitalization
with respect to other factors as is predicted by the Averch-Johnson
effect.
b) Short run production function
Estimating the system of equations presented in eq. (5.9) with
MLE, where Kq is fixed and

is excluded, we obtained the results

presented in Tables 14 and 15.
The model provides estimates for technical inefficiency as well
as allocative inefficiency. Once again, private firms (full sample)
show the highest

level of mean technical inefficiency, 24.56Z.

Cooperative utilities are the most efficient firms with a mean
technical inefficiency of 6.72Z, as compared to 10.98Z for public
utilities. When the sample of private plants was divided in large and
small plants,

small private plants indicated a mean technical

inefficiency of 5.01Z while large private plants showed a mean
technical inefficiency of 24.89Z.

Comparison of cost of mean

technical inefficiency indicates that small private and cooperatives
utilities have an almost identical percentage of their total cost due
to technical inefficiency, that is 6.17Z and 6.37Z respectively.
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Public utilities come behind with 10.26% of their total cost due to
technical inefficiency.
Table 14
System of equations
Short run production function
(asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses)
type of
ownership

constant
A

capital
a .

private
(150 obs.)

-9.564
(-17.12)

.1134
(1.17)

priv(small)

-10.76 -.1047
(-22.78) (-5.85)

priv(large) 24 -4.067

.2998

fuel
c

labor
b

V
dj

log L
(value)

.860
.0807 -.126
(23.1) (12.5)

-12.132

1.149
(75.1)

.0835 -.173 -131.55
(12.1)(-1.23)

.3830

.4307 -.0815 -.9937

public
(33 obs.)

-10.13
.041
(-22.46) (1.19)

.961
.0781 -.0524 -39.2
(34.7) (5.91) (1.23)

cooperative
(71 obs.)

-10.08
(-34.26)

.958
.0957 -.024
(46.4) (7.43)

.028
(0.29)

-94.64

Table 15
System of equations
Short run production function
Estimates of Ancillary parameters
(Asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses)
type of
ownership

sigma

E(u)

E(u)/(b-

private

.3072
(25.8)

3.862
(4.16)

.603 .309
(8.36)

.2456

.2610

priv(small)

.0688
(4.07)

2.262
(1.23)

.522 .063
(5.24)

.0501

.0617

priv(large)

.3132

792.0

.617

.313

.2489

.3649

public

.1419
(6.36)

4.228
(0.82)

.543 .138
(2.67)

.1098

.1026

cooperative

.0942
(0.99)

2.023
(0.16)

.563 .085
(5.78)

.0672

.0637

lambda

s22

8u

24The likelihood function did not converge because of singular Hessian.

118
5- Conclusion
A summary of the results obtained from the various stochastic
models is presented in Table 16. Most estimated models
organizational

forms show a substantial

for all

level of inefficiency

which had been expected from the analysis of the attenuation of
property rights. The second conclusion is the significance of the
size of plants in explaining inefficiency; almost all models estima
ted for small and large private plants indicated that measures of
inefficiency were almost twice as high for large plants compared to
small plants.

As for the conclusions with respect to the most

efficient type of ownership, the long run models (cost function and
system of equations) indicate that cooperatives are most efficient
followed by public utilities and small private utilities. However,
only the difference between

CO

vs PU and PR appears to be signifi

cant. PU and PR do not have significant different mean inefficiency.
When we consider results from the short run models (cost function and
system of equations), the short run cost function Indicates that PR
are most efficient while the short run system of equations shows no
significant differences between PR and

C O . 25

Finally, all measurement

of inefficiency indicate that technical inefficiency is far more
important

than allocative

inefficiency.

Private

firms did not

show a strong tendancy to over-capitalize with respect

to other

factors of production.

25gesults with respect to efficiency comparison of ownership structure
should be limited to plants of comparable size, cooperatives, public
and small private utilities. Results with respect to large plants
cannot be compared to cooperatives and public plants since we have no
large plants owned by cooperatives and public utilities.
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Table 16
Summary of the Information on efficiency from various models
cost Inefficiency due to
technical
allocative
total
1. Stochastic frontier cost
function
1.1 Long run cost function
1.1.1
a)
b)
c)
d)
1.1.2
1.1.3
1.1.4
1.1.5

private utilities
z = 0.0
z = 0.2
z = 0.5
z m 0.8
small private
large private
public utilities
co-op utilities

17.04%
16.77%
16.39%
18.83%
11.27%
27.25%
11.60%
6.50%

2 Short run cost function
1.2.1
1.2.2
1.2.3
1.2.4
1.2.5

private utilities
small private
large private
public utilities
co-op utilities

11.81%
3.43%
13.36%
?
8.29%

2. system of equations
2.1 Long run stochastic frontier
production function
2.1.1 private utilities
a) z ■ 0.0
b) z ■ 0.2
c) z - 0.5
d) z = 0.8
2.1.2 small private
2.1.3 large private
2.1.4 public utilities
2.1.5 co-op utilities

23.30%
23.30%
23.60%
26.40%
15.77%
31.55%
12.90%
1.50%

2 Short run stochastic frontier
production function
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
2.2.5

private utilities
small private
large private
public utilities
co-op utilities

26.10%
6.17%
36.49%
10.26%
o.37%

4.13%
4.27%
4.00%
6.44%
4.41%
4.05%
4.30%
2.80%

27.43%
27.57%
27.60%
32.84%
20.18%
35.60%
17.20%
4.30%

SIXTH CHAPTER
CONCLUSION
This research aims at testing the effects of ownership structure
on efficiency of various organizational forms: privately-owned
regulated electric utilities (PR), publicly-owned electric utilities
(PU) and consumer-owned cooperative electric utilities

(CO). A

comparison of those organizational forms has been conducted on the
basis of (1) their structure of property rights, (2) their structure
of incentives, and (3) their structure of enforcement of those
rights. Property rights are defined with respect to their exclusi
vity, appropriability, and transferability.
The structure of property rights of PR has been shown to be
attenuated because of separation of ownership from control,

and

because of regulation. The incentives of the principals, the stock
holders and the consumers, are affected mostly because of attenuation
of appropriability and transferability. After rate of regulation is
effective, stock holders have no further incentives to further
specialize as monitors. Consumers expect reduce prices from improved
efficiency but they can appropriate further gains

from improved

efficiency only proportionally to their level of transaction with PR.
Furthermore, they have no claim over future improvements of PR. They
are expected to behave as free riders and supply less than optimal
monitoring activities. Furthermore, neither the financial market nor
the managerial labor market are expected to produce optimal level of
monitoring. Politicians are not expected to monitor PR efficiently
since they are elected every four years and over many issues. Voters

120

121

are expected to shirk their task of being properly informed on
preferences of politicians as well as on their records with respect
to efficiency of electric utilities. The regulatory commission has to
account for consumers as well as stock holders. It is believed that
it accepts the costs given by managers of electric utilities and add
to it the appropriate cost of capital.

They have to arbitrate

among various goals, and are subject to lobby on the part of the
industry.
The property rights structure of PU is attenuated because of
separation of ownership from control, and because the ownership
is inherited through residency. Appropriability is limited because
residents have access to increased efficiency only proportionally to
their level of transaction with the PU. They have no claim over
expected future Improvement of the team of production. Transferabili
ty is limited since residents have no individual claims over the
assets of the plants. The incentives of the principals, the consumers
who are residents, are further attenuated because of the free rider
problem as for consumers of PR. As for PR, the political market is
not expected to produce optimal level of monitoring with respect to
efficiency of PU.
All aspects of property rights of CO are also attenuated. Appro
priability is limited to the level of transaction of each members
with the CO and by the impossibility of capitalizing expected future
residuals into present value of the asset of the co-op. However,
members hold partial claims over the assets of the CO. Transferabili
ty of those claims is limited since there is no financial market to
trade them. Members can sell them back to the co-op. Monitoring
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activities will be performed mostly by the board of directors elected
by the members every year over a single issue: the efficiency of CO.
Even though members of CO are expected to be more committed to their
co-op than consumers with respect to PR and PU,

they are still

expected to suffer from the free rider problem. However, the level of
monitoring of CO is likely to be strongly influenced by the Rural
Electrification Administration (REA) who finances almost entirely the
operations of the rural electrical cooperatives. CO

haveto submit

financial data and other statistics to the REA each month.
Because of the attenuation of the structure of property rights
for all three organizational forms, we can predict that they will
show some degree of inefficiency. As for the comparison of efficiency
between ownership

structures, even though

we cannot

claimto

rigou-

rously proove the

superiority of property rights of

CO over

PR and

PU, the structure of incentives and control of CO seems superior
because of (1) a more direct link with management (homogeneity of
interest), (2) a more individual ownership claim over the assets, (3)
a

simpler political market, (4) the incentives and control structure

of REA. The comparison of PR and PU is even more difficult, therefo
re, we should expect that their measures of efficiency will be
closely related to each other.
Few research dealing with this issue with respect to electric
utilities are available. Most of them have tested for efficiency
comparison using a dummy variable model. Such model shows serious
limitations since the concept of average function, which is used
in the dummy variable model, does not represent the most efficient
technology. The dummy variable measures a combination of random
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shocks, technical and allocative Inefficiencies, and is not capable
of discriminating among them. No absolute measures of technical
and allocative inefficiencies can be obtained from such model. An
other research using a non-frontier estimation technique attempts
to compare efficiency of public and private electric utilities,
but such methodology is limited since no measure of technical
efficiency is obtained.

Furthermore, it is plagued with contra

dictions and does not fully account
among ownership types.

Therefore,

for technology differences
little is known on the issue

under investigation in this research, and much remains to be done.
The choice of an appropriate methodology is crucial to conduct a
comparative analysis of efficiency differences between organizational
forms. Several models are available to measure efficiency of firms:
(1) deterministic non parametric model, (2) deterministic parametric
model, (3) deterministic statistical frontier model, (4) stochastic
frontier model, (5) non frontier efficiency models, (6) total factor
productivity model, (7) dummy variable model. The stochastic frontier
model has been selected. When compared to other models the stochastic
frontier model offers several advantages:
(a) it allows an unlimited number of observations to be technic
ally efficient,
(b) it is not sensitive to outliers,
(c) random shocks, statistical noise, and measurement errors are
not confused with measurement of technical efficiency,
(d) the stochastic frontier model permits measurement of tech
nical and allocative efficiency separately, and these estimates
have testable, statistical properties,
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(e) Che concept of stochastic frontier represents the theorical
concept of most efficient technology,
(f) it solves the bounded range problem of the deterministic
statistical model.
The weaknesses of the stochastic frontier model are:
(a) it is limited in the selection of functional form since the
production function must be homothetic,
(b) it has no

a priori

good argument to select a distribution

for the disturbance term.
The essential idea, behind the stochastic frontier model is that
the error term is composed of two parts: a symmetric component that
permits random variation of the frontier across firms, and captures
the effect of measurement error, other statistical noise, and random
shocks outside the control of the firm; and a one-sided component
which captures the effect of inefficiency relative to the stochastic
frontier. This is represented by y-f(x)-(u+v) where v is the symme
tric component and u the one-sided component, u>0, and represents the
absolute measure of technical inefficiency. Measures of allocative
efficiency can be obtained from the residual of the first order
conditions from cost minimization.
After choosing the stochastic frontier model to measure efficien
cy, we need to select a proper functional form; for this research we
have selected a Cobb-Douglas function. The estimation of a stochastic
frontier Cobb-Douglas function (production and/or cost) provides all
the required information to measure, and therefore compare among
various organizational forms, absolute technical and allocative
inefficiencies. Moreover, it does not create critical distortions in
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the estimated results of technical and allocative efficiencies.
Finally, a Cobb-Douglas function captures the critical characteris
tics of the technology of electricity generation.
The complete model requires that we select a proper objective
function to characterize the behavior of the firm. This is an
important task since measurement of inefficiencies depends on a
standard of comparison which is derived from our behavioral hypothe
ses with regard to each ownership structure. In the electric utili
ties, the literature strongly suggests that output and the prices it
pays for inputs are exogenous to the firm.

Therefore,

electric

utilities are expected to behave as cost minimizers. The arguments
presented to justify cost minimization for private utilities can
apply to public as well as cooperative utilities.
From the stochastic frontier Cobb-Douglas production function
and the objective function of cost minimization, we can derive
the models to be estimated:
run cost function,
function,

(1) a stochastic frontier C-D long

(2) a stochastic frontier C-D short run cost

(3) a system of equations comprised of a stochastic

frontier C-D long run production function and the first order
conditions derived from the cost minimizing Lagrangian,

(4) a

system of equations comprised of a stochastic frontier C-D short
run production function and the first order conditions derived
from the cost minimizing Lagrangian. The estimation of those models
is done through MLE using numerical techniques and Davidon-FletcherPowe11. The ML estimation requires a proper likelihood function which
is derived from an hypothesis with respect to the density function of
u, v and e^ (residuals from the first order conditions).
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Those models have been estimated using data from the steam
electric generation in the U.S.. This industry shows interesting
characteristics:

(1) three different ownership structures are

generating electricity using the same technology;

(2) standardized

data for all three types of firms are available; (3) technology of
steam-electric utilities has been studied for over 25 years. The data
are measured at the plant level, and are from the first full year of
operation through the fifth year.
Results

from the estimation of the models presented earlier

indicate that:
(a) all three types of ownership structures suffer from some
degree of inefficiencies,
(b) estimations of long run models (cost function and system of
equations) rank cooperative utilities as the most efficient
ownership structure; the difference between CO vs PR and PU is
important and statistically significant. Moreover, measures of
inefficiencies of PU and PR are not significantly different.
(c) estimations of short run models (cost function and system of
equations) produce ambiguous results; the stochastic frontier
short run cost function puts the PR as the most efficient
ownership structure while the system of equations shows
identical inefficiency measurement for both Pr and CO. PU shows
the highest level of inefficiency.
(d) total inefficiency is composed mostly of technical ineffic
iency. All types of firms show a small level of allocative
inefficiency, including privately-owned regulated electric
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utilities. Therefore, private firms did not show a strong
tendancy to over-capitalize.
(e) all comparison between those three types of ownership
structures have been done for comparable size of plants. When
efficiency measurement is compared for small and large plants,
inefficiency of large plants nearly doubles compared to
inefficiency of small plants (this comparison has been done
only for PR since CO and PU did not have large plants).
This research has proven to be fruitful in that it lends to
further support to the hypothesis derived from the property rights
theory to the effect that a specific reward system is needed to
stimulate a particular productivity response. Attenuation of property
rights allows further discretionary behavior on the parts of the
agents against the best interests of the principals. Such discretion
ary behavior is translated mostly in terms of overutilization of all
resources contrary to the general belief built on the Averch-Johnson
effect. Our analysis of the property rights structure of PR, PU and
CO had lead to the weak conclusion that CO would be expected to be
more efficient than PR and PU. Even though all models do not generate
such conclusion, the overall performance of CO with respect

to

efficiency measurement put them first followed by PR and PU which
cannot be significantly distinguished.
Such results can have important policy implications since all
three types of ownership structures are the results of direct
government interventions:

(1) regulation of private utilities, (2)

direct investment of government in the electric utility industry, (3)
rural electrification program supervised by REA. It would appear that
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both programs of regulation and direct Investment produce similar
results In terms of Inefficiency. From a policy point of view, it Is
therefore difficult to recommand one over the other. However, the
rural electrification appears to have been a success from the
efficiency point of view. Regulators have been more concerned with
proper level of price of capital over the years, but our results
strongly suggest

that they should be much more concerned with

technical inefficiency than allocative inefficiency. That conclusion
implies a different philosophy with respect to regulation and should
lead to further Investigations.

Finally,

the strong efficiency

difference between small and large plants (nearly twice as much for
large plants) should be a major concern for regulators.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Afriat, S.N., (Efficiency Estimation of Production Functions,»
International Economic Review, 1972,13, 3, pp.568-598.
Aigner, D.J., T. Amemiya and D.J. Poirier, (On the Estimation of
Production Frontiers: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the
Parameters of a Discontinuous Density Function,) International
Economic Review, 1976, 17, 2, pp. 377-396.
Aigner, D.J. and S.F. Chu, «0n Estimating the Industry Production
Function,) American Economic Review, 1968, 58,4, pp. 826-839.
Atgner, D.V, C.A. Lovell and P. Schmidt, (Formulation and Estima
tion of Stochastic Frontier Production Function Models,) Journal
of Econometrics, 1977, 6, pp. 21-37.
Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz, (Production, Information Costs and
Economic Organization,) American Economic Review, 1972, 62, pp.
778-793.
Annual Statistical Report - Rural Electric Borrowers (1966-1978),
Rural Electrification Administration, U.S. Department of Agricul
ture.
Arrow, K.L., H.B. Chenery, B..S. Mlnhas and R.M. Solow, (Capital
Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency,) Review of Economics
and Statistics, 1961, 43, pp. 225-235.
Atkinson, S.E. and R. Halvorsen, (Interfuel Substitution in Steam
Electric Power Generation,) Journal of Political Economy, 1976,
84, pp. 959-978.
Barzel, Y., (Productivity in the Electric Power Industry, 1929-1955,)
Review of Economics and Statistics, 1963, 45, pp. 395-408.
Barzel, Y., (The Production Function and Technical Change in the
Steam-Power Industry,) Journail of Political Economy, 1963, 72,
pp. 133-150.
Belinfante, A., (Technical Change in the Steam Electric Power
Industry,) in Production Economics: A Dual Approach to Theory and
Application, eds. M. Fuss and D.L.McFadden, Amsterdam: North
Holland, 1969.
Berndt, E.R. and L.R. Christensen, (The Internal Structure of
Functional Relationship : Separability, Substitution, and
Aggregation,) Review of Economic Studies, 1973, 40, pp. 403-410.
Berndt, E.R. and D.O. Wood, (Technology,Prices, and the Derived
Demand for Energy,) The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1975,
57, 3, pp. 259-268.

129

130
Brown, M. and J.S. Canl, (Technological change and the distribution
of income,* International Economic Review, 1963, 4, pp. 289-309.
Brown, M . , On the Measurement of Technological Change, Cambridge
University Press, 1966.
Bruggink, T.,(Public vs Private Enterprise in the Municipal Water
Industry: a Comparison of Operating Cost,* Quaterly Review of
Economics and Business, 1982, 22, I, pp. 111-125.
Caves, D.W. and L.R. Christensen, (The Relative Efficiency of
Public and Private Firms in a Competitive Environment: the Case
of Canadian Railroads,* Journal of Political Economy, 1980, 88,
5, pp. 958-976.
Christensen, L.R. and W.H. Greene, (Economies of Scale in U.S.
Electric Power Generation,* Journal of Political Economy, 1976,
84, 4, pp. 655-676.
Christensen, L.R. and E.R. Berndt, (The Translog Function and the
Substitution of Equipment, Structures, and Labor in U.S
Manufacturing,* Journal of Econometrics, 1973, 16, pp. 81-114.
Courville, L., (Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Indus
try, » Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1974, 5,
pp. 54-73.
Cowing, T.G., (Technical Change and Scale Economies in an Engine
ering Production Function: The Case of Steam Electric Power,*
Journal of Industrial Economics, 1974, 23, pp. 135-152.
Cowing, T.G. and V.K. Smith, (The Estimation of a Production Techno
logy : A Survey of Econometric Analyses of Steam-Electric Genera
tion,* Land Economics, 1978, 54, 2, pp. 156-186.
Cowing, T.G. and M.S. Khaled, (Parametric Productivity Measurement
and Choice among Flexible Functional Forms,* Journal of Political
Economy, 1979, 87, 6, pp. 1220-1245.
Crain, M.W. and A. Zardkoohi, (A Test of Property Rights Theory of
the Firm: Water Utilities in the U.S.,* Journal of Law and Econo
mics, 1978, pp. 395-408.
De Alessl, L., (Property Rights, Transaction Cost, and Efficiency,*
American Economic Review, 1983, 73, pp. 64-81.
De Alessl, L., (Managerial Tenure under Private and Government
Ownership in the Electric Power Industry,* Journal of Political
Economy, 1974, 82, pp. 645-653.
Demsetz, H., (Toward a Theory of Property Rights,* American Economic
Review, 1967, pp. 347-359.

131
Demsetz, H. , (The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the
Firm,! Journal of Law and Economic, 1983, 26, 2, pp. 375-390.
Demsetz, H., (Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint,!
Journal of Law and Economics, 1969, 12, pp. 1-22.
Dilorenzo, T.J. and R. Robinson, (Managerial Objectives Subject to
Political Market Constraints: Electric utilities in the U.S.,!
• Quartely Review of Business and Economics, 1982, 22, 2, pp.
113-125.
Dhrymes,P.J. and M.Kurz, (Technology and Scale in Electricity
Generation,! Econometrlca, 1964, 32, 3, pp. 287-315.
Dobra, J.L., (Property Rights in Bureaucratles and Bureaucratic
Efficiency,! Public Choice, 1983, 40, pp. 95-99.
Doyle, J., (Lines Across the Land: Rural Electric Cooperatives, the
Changing Politics in Rural America,! 1979, Washington: The Rural
Land and Energy Project Environmental Policy Institute.
Fama, E.F., (Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm,! Journal of
Political Economy, 1980, 88, 2, pp. 288-307.
Farrel, M.J., (The Measurement of Productive Efficiency,! Journal
of the Statistical Society A, 1957, 120, 3, pp. 253-281.
Farrel, M.J. and M. Fieldhouse, (Estimating Efficient Production
Function under Increasing Returns to Scale,!
Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society, 1962, 2, pp. 252-267.
Federal Power Commission (1965-1978), Statistics of Publicly-Ow
ned Electric Utilities in the U.S., Washington, U.S. Government
Printing Office.
Federal Power Commission (1965-1978), Statistics of Privately-Owned
Electric Utilities in the U.S., Washington, U.S. Government
Printing Office.
Federal Power Commission (1965-1973), Steam Electric Plant Construc
tion Cost and Annual Production Expenses, Washington, U.S.
Government Printing Office.
Fenn., S., America's Electric Utilities under Siege and in Transi
tion, 1984, Praeger Publishers.
Ferguson, C.E., Microeconomic Theory, 1969, ed. Richard Irwin,
inc., Homewood, Illinois.
Fischer, F.M., (The Existence of Aggregate Production Function,!
Econometrlca, 1969, 37, pp. 553-557.

132
Forsund, F.R., van den Broeck, J., and L. Hjalmarsson, «0n the
Estimation of Deterministic and Stochastic Frontier Production
Functions - a Comparison,* Journal of Econometrics, 1980, 13, pp.
117-138.
Forsund, F.R. and L. Hjarlmarsson, «0n the Measurement of Producti
ve Efficiency,* Swedish Journal of Economics, 1974, 76, pp.
141-154.
Forsund, F.R. and L. Hjalmarsson, «Generalized Farrel Measures of
Efficiency: an Application to Milk Processing in Swedish Dairy
Plants,* The Economic Journal, 1979, 89, pp. 294-315.
Forsund, F.R and E.S. Jansen, «0n Estimating Average and Best
Practice Homothetic Production Functions via Cost Functions,*
International Economic Review, 1979, 18, pp. 463-476.
Forsund, F.R., K. Lovell and P. Schmidt, «A Survey of Frontier
Production Functions and of their Relationship to Efficiency
Measurement,* Journal of Econometrics, 1980, 13, pp. 5-25.
Freeh, H.F., «The Property Rights Theory of the Firm: Empirical
Results from a Natural Experiment,* Journal of Political Economy,
1976, 84, 1, pp. 143-152.
Furubotn, E.G. and S. Pejovich, ((Property Rights and Economic
Theory: a Survey of Recent Literature,* Journal of Economic
Literature, 1972, 10, 4, pp. 1137-1162.
Fuss, M.A. and D.L. McFadden, ((Flexibility vs Efficiency in Ex Ante
Plant Design,* in Production Economics: A Dual Approach to Theory
and Application, 1974, eds. M. Fuss and D.L. McFadden, Amsterdam,
North Holland.
Gallup, F.M. and S.H. Karlson, «The Electric Power Industry:
An Econometric Model of Intertemporal Behavior,* Land Economics,
1980, 56, 3, pp. 299-314.
Greene, W.H., ((Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Econometric Frontier
Functions,* Journal of Econometrics, 1980, 13, pp. 27-56.
Greene, W.H., «0n the Estimation of a Flexible Frontier Production
Function,* Journal of Econometrics, 1980, 13, pp. 101-115.
Greene, W.H., Estimator for Limited and Qualitative Dependent
Variable Models and Sample Selectivity Models, 1980, New York
University, New York.
Heilman, R., Government Competition in the Electric Utility Industry
- A Theorical Approach and Empirical Study, 1982, Praeger
Publishers.
Henderson, J.M. and R.E. Quandt, Microeconomie Theory: a Mathemati
cal Approach, 1980, third edition, Mcgraw-Hill Book co.

133

Hildebrand, G.H. and T.C. Liu, Manufacturing Production Function in
the U.S., 1965, Ithaca, New-York State.
Huettner, D.A. and J.H. Landon, (Electric Utilities: Scale Economies
and Diseconomies,* Souther Economic Journal, 1978, 44, 4, pp.
883-912.
Hughes, W.R., «Scale Frontier in Electric Power* in Capron, Technolo
gical Change in Regulated Industries, 1971, pp. 44-85,Washing
ton, The Brookings Institution.
Intriligator,M.D., Econometric Models, Techniques, and Applica
tions, 1978, Prentice-Hall inc.
Jensen, M.C. and H.W. Meckling, «Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure,* Journal of Finan
cial Economics, 1976, 3, pp. 305-360.
Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling, ((Rights and Production Function: an
Application to LMF and Co-Determination,* Journal of Business,
1979, 52, 4, pp. 469-506.
Jondrow, J., C.A.K. Lovell, I.S. Materov and P. Schmidt, «0n the
Estimation of Technical Inefficiency in the Stochastic Frontier
Production Function Model,* Journal of Econometrics, 1982, 19,
pp. 233-238.
Joskow, P.L. and R. Schmalensee, Markets for Power, an Analysis of
Electric Utility Deregulation, 1984, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Judge, G.G., W.E. Griffiths, R.C.Hill and T.C. Lee, The Theory
and Practice of Econometrics, 1980, John Whiley and Sons, New
York.
Kmenta, J.,
Co. Inc.

Elements of Econometrics, 1971, Macmillan Publishing

IComiya, R., (Technological Progressand The Production
the U.S. Steam Power Industry,* Review of Economics
tics, 1962, 44, pp. 156-166.

Function in
and Statis

Kolbe, L.A. and J.A. Read, The Cost of Capital: Estimating the Rate
of Return for Electric Utilities, 1984, The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Kopp, R.J. and V.K. Smith, (Frontier Production Function estimation
for Steam Electric Generation,* Southern Economic Journal, 1980,
46, 4 pp. 1049-1059.
Lau, L.J. and P.A. Yotopoulos, (A Test for Relative Efficiency
and Application to Indian Agriculture,* American Economic Review,
1971, 61, 1, pp. 94-109.

134

Lau, J.L. and P.A. Yotopoulos, «A Test of Relative Economic Effici
ency,* American Economic Review, 1973, 63, 1, pp. 214-223.
Lee, L.F. and W.G. Tyler, ((The Stochastic Frontier Production
Function and Average Efficiency,* Journal of Econometrics, 1978,
7, pp. 385-389.
McFadden, D., ((Notes on the Estimation of the Elasticity of Substitu
tion,* Institute of Business and Economic Research, Berkely:
University of California, 1964, Working paper 57.
Mckean, R., ((Property Rights Within Government, and Devices to
Increase Governmental Efficiency,* Southern Economic Journal,
1972, pp. 177-186.
Meeusen, W. and J. van den Broeck, ((Efficiency Estimation from
Cobb-Douglas Production Functions with Composed Error,* Interna
tional Economic Review, 1977, 18, 2, pp.
435-444.
Meyer, R.A., ((Publicly Owned vs Privatly Owned Utilities: a Policy
Choice,* Review of Economic and Statistic, 1975, 57, 4, pp.
391-399.
Nadiri, M.I., ((Some Approaches to the Theory and Measurement of
Total Factor Productitity: a Survey,* Journal of Economic
Literature, 1970, 8, pp. 1137-1177.
Nerlove, M., Returns to Scale in Electricity Supply in Measurement
in Economic Studies, in honnor of Yehuda Grunfeld,1963.
Nerlove, M., Estimation and Identification of Cobb-Douglas Produc
tion Functions, 1965, Chicago.
Olson, J.A., P. Schmidt and D.M. Waldman, «A Monte Carlo Study of
Stochastic Frontier Production Functions,* Journal of
Econometrics, 1980, 13, pp. 67-82.
Pescatrice, D.K. and J.M. Trapani, ((The Performance and Objectives
of Public and Private Utilities Operating in the U.S.,* Journal
of Public Economy, 1980, 13, pp. 259-276.
Petersen, H.C., «An Empirical Test of Regulatory Effects,* Bell
Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1975, 6, pp.
111-126.
The Power committee, Electric Power and Government Policy: A Survey
of the Relations between the Government and the Industry 1948,
New York, The Twentieth Century Fund.
Richmond, J., ((Estimating the Efficiency of Production,* Internation
al Economic Review, 1974, 15, 2, pp. 515-521.

135

Scott, D., Financing the Growth of Electric Utilities, 1976, Praeger
Publishers.
Schmidt, P., «0n the Statistical Estimation of Parametric Production
Functions,* The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1976, 58, pp.
238-239.
Schmidt, P., «0n the Statistical Estimation of Parametric Production
Function : a Rejoinder,* Review of Economics and Statistics,
1978, 60, 3, pp. 481-482.
Schmidt, P. and K. Lovell, ((Estimating Technical and Allocative
Inefficiency Relative to S t o c h a s t i c P r o d u c t i o n and
Cost-Frontiers,» Journal of Econometrics, 1979, 9, pp. 343-366.
Schmidt, P. and C.K. Lovell, ((Estimating Stochastic Production
and Cost Frontiers when Technical and Allocative Inefficiency are
Correlated,* Journal of Econometrics, 1980, 13, pp. 83-100.
Seitz, W.D., ((Productive Efficiency in the Steam Electric Generat
ing Industry,* Journal of Political Economy, 1971, 79, 3, pp.
878-886.
Sowell, C.B., A study of Electricity Costs and Pricing under Private
and Public Ownership,
1978, University of Georgia, PH.D.
dissertation.
Stevenson, R.E., ((Likelihood Functions for Generalized Stochastic
Frontier Estimation,* Journal of Econometrics, 1980, 13, pp.
57-66.
Stevenson, R., «X-Inefficiency and Interfirm Rivalry: Evidence
from the Electric Utility Industry,* Lands Economics, 1982, 58,
1, pp. 52-66.
Stewart, J.F., «Plant Size, Plant Factor, and the Shape of the
Average Cost Function in Electric Power Generation: A Non homoge
neous Approach,* Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10, 2, pp.
549-565.
Stigler, G., «The Xlstence of X-Efficiency,* American Economic
Review, 1976, 66, pp. 213-216.
Tapon, F. and J. Van der Weide, ((Effectiveness of Regulation in the
Electric Utility Industry,* Journal of Economics and Business,
1979, 31, 3, pp. 180-189.
Timmer, C.P., «Using a Probalistic Frontier Production Function to
Measure Technical Efficiency,* Journal of Political Economy,
1971, 79, pp. 776-794.

136

Toda, Y., ((Estimation of a Cost Function when the Cost is not
Minimum: the Case of Soviet Manufacturing Industries, 1958—
71,» Review of Economics and Statistics, 1976, 58, 3, pp.
259-268.
Wallis, F.K., Topics in applied econometrics, 1979, University
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Wilson, G.W. and J.M. Jadlow, ((Competition, Profit Incentives,
and Technical Efficiency in the Provision of Nuclear Medecine
Services,! The Bell Journal of Economics, 1982, 13, 2, pp.
472-482.
Zellner, A., J. Kmenta and J. Dreze, ((Specification and Estimation
of Cobb-Douglas Production Function Models,! Econometrlca,
1966,34, 4, pp. 784-795.
Zellner, A. and N. Revankar, ((Generalized Production Functions,!
Review of Economics and Statistics, 1969, 36, pp. 241-250.

VITA
Daniel 0. Cote was born on march 1, 1951 in Quebec, Canada.

Mr.

Cote received his B.A. degree in Business Administration from Ecoles
des Hautes Etudes Commerciales in 1976.
Economics,

Mr.

Pursuing his interests in

Cote attended Louisiana State University in 1979,

completing an M.sc. degree in Economics in 1980, and an M.sc. degree
in Agricultural Economics in 1981.
the Ph.D. degree in

1980.

He was admitted to candidacy for

Mr. Cote is presently employed at the

Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales in Montreal, Canada.
resides at 775 rue Gratton, St-Laurent, Quebec, Canada.

137

Mr. Cote

DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate:

Daniel 0. Cote

Major Field:

Economics

T itle o f Dissertation:

Effect of Ownership Structure on Efficiency:
Analysis of Various Organizational Forms

A Comparative

Approved:

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Gradua/e School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

Date of Examination:

February 25, 1986

